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Getting the Balance Right: Basic Research, Missions 
and Governance for Horizon 2020 
 
Summary 
 
The question ‘What is the right balance between basic and applied research?’ is 
often asked but has no single answer that would be valid at all times and in all 
places.  Rather it depends upon the state of development of an individual 
economy and the extent to which it comprises science-based versus other 
kinds of industry.  The discussion is made no easier by the politicised nature of 
the term ‘basic research’, which can at once mean research dealing with 
fundamental phenomena and researcher-initiated research.  To tackle the 
question, therefore, this paper addresses both the cognitive and the political or 
governance dimensions of ‘basic research’.  Our discussion starts with what we 
know about the question from the history of science and the research-on-
research literature, moves on to look at some examples of how countries make 
the trade-off and then uses the findings from these to shed light on the 
composition and governance of Horizon 2020.   
 
The science lobby and basic research 
Periodically, representatives of the scientific community choose to lobby with 
the aim of raising the share of funding that goes to basic research.  A typical 
recent example is the ‘Aarhus Declaration’, which argues that providing more 
money for the scientific community to spend on ‘excellent’ basic research is the 
only way to guarantee the health of the research and higher education system 
and therefore economic prosperity.  It concludes that the scientific community 
should itself allocate this funding to its members based solely on excellence, 
without bureaucracy or consideration for societal relevance.  There is no 
empirical evidence that would justify such a claim, which conflates ‘basic 
research’ as a cognitive category or type of research with ‘basic research’ as a 
style of research governance.   
More generally, however, we depend upon the scientific community to 
distribute basic research funding through organisations such as research 
councils. This is based on its ability to make judgements of scientific quality.  
Between the Second World War and the 1960s-70s, the ‘social contract’ 
between the scientific community and society left a lot of control in the hands 
of that community.  Since then, there have been increasing demands from 
society for a more explicit return on its scientific investment.  Compromises 
have emerged in which the ‘excellence’ style is used to govern some of the 
national research effort while the balance is thematically programmed towards 
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societal needs (sometimes referred to as ‘missions’).  Two governance styles 
therefore co-exist, usually in separate organisations.  Both actually fund basic 
research and while the researcher-governed channels tend to pay for a much 
higher proportion of fundamental work, there is generally also a lot of 
fundamental work done in support of societal missions.   
Scientists often disagree about what ‘basic research’ is, as a type of activity.  
Generally, it is seen as relating to fundamental phenomena and often it is 
linked to the idea of curiosity-driven research – to such an extent that the 
statistical definition is that research is basic research if the scientist doing it 
cannot specify how it would be applied.  This has the paradoxical implication 
that the same experiment done by two scientists can at once be basic and 
applied, providing only one of them knows why she or he is doing it. In reality, 
large amonts of ‘basic’ research are done with pretty clear ideas about purpose: 
Pasteur, for example did his work on food safety in order to protect human 
health – his basic research was not just driven by curiosity.   
In theory, the more fundamental research is, the less willing industry will be to 
fund it, because it is hard to appropriate and monopolise the results.  Hence, 
the state steps in and pays for most of the cost of basic research. When things 
are more applied, industry funds a growing share of the cost.  As more and 
more research-capable people work in various parts of the economy, so an 
increasing proportion of research is done in industry, typically in order to 
solve problems.  Some of this is actually basic research, in the sense of being 
fundamental.  In practice, industry does basic research in areas where it sees 
opportunities to get a return on investment, even if that is only a small part of 
the total returns on the research.   
 
How research relates to innovation 
Discussion of the relationship between science or research and innovation is 
bedevilled by mythology and bad history.  In the popular imagination, science 
leads to the development of technology.  Historically, however, technology has 
tended to encourage the emergence of science. Some like to debate whether 
basic or applied research has more impact.  The evidence is that both have 
societal impacts, but on different timescales and across much longer periods 
than one would imagine (or, indeed, than policymakers who have to argue for 
research funding would like).   
In terms of economic and social development, the key issue is not necessarily 
the distinction between basic and applied work but the separation of 
innovation and research activities from production.  We can think of this 
separation occurring in history through two stages: first, a separation of the 
innovation function from production through the creation of specialised 
design, engineering, machine building and technology functions whose 
business is to improve production but not themselves to do production; 
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second, the development of fields of science that shed further light on 
innovation opportunities but that operate at a much higher level of generality.  
Once both the specialised technology and the more generic science systems are 
in place, it becomes increasingly difficult to untangle their roles in industrial 
and societal progress – they are both involved.  However, it is clear that new 
scientific ideas have no market or societal impact unless and until they are 
coupled to users and their needs.  The stock of existing knowledge remains 
immensely important in innovation.  
The ‘science tribe’ argues that good science is done without reference to 
potential application.  The corollary that relevant science is bad science does 
not hold water, empirically.  The research-on-research literature contains large 
numbers of studies that show complementarities between scientific 
publication, patenting, contract research and consulting in relevant fields.  
Academics who co-operate with industry tend to do better than their 
colleagues on conventional measures of academic quality and productivity.   
Once we look at the respective impacts of basic and applied research, it 
becomes clear that both are important.  It can often take longer for the societal 
impacts of basic research to become visible than those of applied research but 
basic research is connected to use by applied activities – whether they take 
place in specialised research organisations like institutes and universities or 
within companies.  Generally, the timescales involved are very long – decades, 
rather than the short periods within which politicians and policymakers prefer 
to see the results of their actions.   
 
Basic and applied research at the national level 
If we look at research at the level of national R&D statistics, we see some 
suggestive shifts in the relative importance of basic research, applied research 
and development.  At the overall level, there is a clear pattern that richer 
countries spend more of their GDP on R&D than poorer ones.  This 
relationship is complex: many other factors such as resource endowments 
affect GDP and efforts to identify short-term relationships between growth in 
R&D and growth in GDP have not been successful.  There is also a relationship 
between the proportion of GDP spent on R&D in the business sector and in the 
higher education sector.  In general, the mix between state and business 
spending on R&D changes during the process of economic development. 
Typically, the state is the dominant spender in poorer countries and the share 
of total spending coming from business increases, as countries get richer.  It 
seems that there is an ‘entry ticket’ countries need to pay in the form of a 
higher education sector that provides the human capital needed to do R&D in 
both the state and in business.  As business R&D grows, so the higher 
education sector must grow (albeit at a slower rate) in order to keep up the 
supply of people.  Inherently, the higher education sector tends to do basic 
research, thus as the business R&D effort increases, so does the amount of 
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basic research done.  This may not mean that the proportion of basic 
research done in the economy grows – for example, in China this has stuck 
obstinately at around 5% through the past quarter century of extremely rapid 
growth in the R&D system.   
However, there is a second pattern, which is that during the process of 
development countries play catch-up, putting a lot of effort into applied as well 
as basic research in order to acquire and apply knowledge.  As they approach 
the ‘frontier’ in technology and science, they need increasingly to generate new 
and sophisticated solutions so the share of basic research tends to go up.  The 
broader trend towards technology becoming more science-intensive probably 
reinforces this shift towards the basic. The pattern of overall and government 
R&D activity in highly successful innovating countries, however, shows that it 
is important to do the development work needed for innovation.  Here Europe 
is well behind the leaders.   
The bulk of governments’ own R&D spending goes to fund particular missions 
– only a small fraction is spent on researcher-initiated projects through 
research councils or similar organisations.  However, a lot of basic research is 
actually done within mission-driven research programmes that aim to meet 
specific societal needs.  The successful US and Chinese examples show the 
importance of coupling research capacity and activity to these missions.   
The numbers therefore tend to confirm the interdependence of the basic and 
applied parts of the research system.  To secure growth and development, it is 
crucial that the business R&D system expand so that the nation is strong in 
innovation – and this naturally drives an expansion in higher education and 
basic research, though at a lower rate.  There needs to be significant 
investment in development-based innovation activities in both industry and 
the state.  Basic research funding needs not only to come from researcher-
directed sources but also to be embedded in thematically programmed 
missions.  The real policy choice is not therefore about the balance between 
basic and applied research but about the extent to which these are pursued 
using  a bottom-up or a programmed style of governance.   
 
The Framework Programme and Horizon 2020 
There has for some time been a discussion of a ‘European paradox’, where it is 
claimed that Europe does a lot of basic research but fails to get value from it in 
terms of innovation and economic success.  Of course, this is only a paradox to 
those who believe innovation is driven by basic research. A more current and 
systemic view would emphasise the need for the parts of the system that 
actually do innovation and production to be healthy and well functioning, with 
high levels of business R&D, strong state R&D investment in industrial and 
societal missions and high participation in higher education.  Nor, in fact, is 
EU R&D as good as we like to imagine.  In particular, EU scientists are 
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significantly less well represented in the 10% of the most highly cited scientific 
publications than their US counterparts, though they do quite well compared 
with the rest of the world.  Horizon 2020 is positioned to tackle these 
challenges not only of research quality but especially of weaknesses in the 
innovation-orientated part of the European research and innovation system.  
Horizon 2020 has three ‘pillars’: Industrial Leadership; Societal Challenges; 
and Excellent Science.   
Historically, the Framework Programme – which Horizon 2020 will replace –
 has many successes in strengthening research and innovation networks in 
Europe.  In the past it has funded missions that largely correspond to the 
industrial and societal pillars of Horizon 2020, generating advances in both 
research and industry.  It has been a strong force coordinating and 
consolidating the European R&D effort and communities.  The recent addition 
of the European Research Council (ERC) to the Framework Programme means 
it now also funds individual researcher-initiated projects as well as mission-
orientated networks.  It brings a new style of governance to the Framework 
Programme, using project-level priority setting with the aid of the scientific 
community in addition to the traditional style of stakeholder-driven 
programming.  The ERC seems to have had a large and positive influence on 
national research councils’ quality standards and proposal review processes, so 
it is exerting a strong leverage over the European ‘basic’ research funding 
system as a whole.   
An important novelty of Horizon 2020 is the ‘downstream’ extension of its 
remit to strengthen innovation processes at the European level.  This cannot 
mean that it will ‘take to market’ ideas developed in more research-orientated 
parts of the programme.  Rather, it must tackle innovation needs case by case, 
on their merits, so as to improve the infrastructures and framework conditions 
necessary to improve European innovation performance.  While this part of 
Horizon 2020 will also ‘leverage’ Member States’ activities and assets, it also 
requires significant expenditures at the European level.   
The diagnosis of European needs in this paper and those that underlie Horizon 
2020 are similar: while the quality of research also needs to be improved, the 
key weaknesses of the European research and innovation system are in 
innovation activities.  Doing more science will not repair those weaknesses.  
Rather, there is a need to expand mission-driven R&D for tackling industrial 
and societal needs.  The ERC seems already to be doing a good job of 
encouraging quality improvements, in partnership with national research 
councils.  The implications for Horizon 2020 are clear. 
 Focus resource increases on the innovation-relevant parts of the industrial 
and societal missions 
 Continue to fund a mixture of basic and applied research within those 
missions, but increase the effort on development and related functions 
vi
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• Maintain but do not increase the ERC effort; instead work in cooperation 
with national research councils to leverage the European level so as to raise 
national as well as European quality levels 
Not least because Horizon 2020 involves setting thematic priorities, it is 
important that the Member States complement it with clear national 
strategies.  The point of Horizon 2020 is partly to ‘optimise’ the European 
research and innovation system at the European level.  Member States 
therefore need to ensure that their own policies complement the European 
strategy in ways that serve the national interest.  In many cases, this will 
involve setting priorities that are not the same as the overall European ones.   
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1. About this paper 
This document presents the results of a short study undertaken on behalf of 
EARTO.  It is intended partly as a contribution to the debate about how 
national governments should fund R&D but especially about to how to think 
about R&D funding at the level of the European Union, where we discuss 
aspects of implementing Horizon 20201 – the set of EU-level research and 
innovation activities that will follow on from the Framework Programmes in 
Research and Technological Development that have run since the mid-1980s.   
The question ‘what is the right balance of funding between basic and applied 
research?’ is often asked.  We can say something about this at particular places 
and times, but the question has no absolute or permanent answer.  There is no 
theoretical basis for saying what such a balance should be.  Rather, what we 
know about national research and innovation systems suggests that if there is 
such a thing as an ideal balance it will be context-dependent and will therefore 
change over time in any particular innovation system.  The question is further 
complicated by the fact that there are multiple definitions of its terms –
 especially of ‘basic’ research, which has some cognitive meanings but also has 
meanings that relate to politics and governance.  In terms of their cognitive 
meanings, it is clear that a well-functioning research and innovation system 
needs both applied and basic research.  In the more political sense, where 
‘basic research’ tends to mean ‘research whose funding is governed by the 
scientific community’ (for example, through research councils), it is clear that 
such researcher-governed research is also important but cannot alone be the 
whole story.   
Here, we argue that a more useful distinction is between general research 
intended to maintain national capability in a wide range of basic and applied 
disciplines and more specific research aiming to support the knowledge needs 
of stakeholders such as industry and the public service.  These imply different 
governance mechanisms.  In the last part of the paper, we analyse Horizon 
2020 and use this distinction as a basis for discussing the desirable balance of 
effort within it.  We argue that the key contribution of Horizon 2020 will be to 
‘structure’ the development of the European research and innovation system 
through actions at the European level that ‘leverage’ Member State efforts 
while respecting the principle of subsidiarity.   
 
 
1 Throughout this paper we deliberately omit Euratom from the discussion and from budget statistics.  Euratom has a 
different intervention logic and trajectory from the larger Framework Programmes on research and technological 
development and the equivalent part of Horizon 2020 
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Europe's global role is changing as large, hitherto 'developing' countries move 
centre stage in global production and research.  This is no reason for Europe to 
be marginalised; rather, it represents a challenge for Europe to build on its 
historic strengths to continue to be a cornerstone and to contribute to the 
sustainability of a much larger and wealthier global economy.  Horizon 2020 – 
the successor to the long-running EU Framework Programme – represents an 
important policy reform, bringing more closely together industrial innovation, 
research and tackling societal 'grand challenges' in an effort to strengthen the 
competitiveness and sustainability of European research, industry and society. 
 It offers the opportunity to reduce the past fragmentation of the EU effort and 
build a more balanced research and innovation system in Europe, overcoming 
some of the well-known bottlenecks in the system such as the so-called 
'European Paradox' and the fragmentation of the research community and 
institutions. 
3
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2. The science lobby and basic research 
Research and innovation policy spans the interest on the one hand of the 
scientific research community in pursuing its own agendas and on the other 
the needs of other societal stakeholders for knowledge to solve problems in 
innovation and more widely in society.  These two communities often act – 
certainly when they lobby for resources – as 'two tribes' with different cultures, 
values and goals.  Institutionally, we can see this in the traditional battle 
between education and industry ministries in most countries, which often 
boils down to a fight for budget.  In policy debate, we see it in the frequent 
refusal of the scientific community to recognise any other criterion than 
'excellence' by which to judge research.  Conflating the types of research with 
the mechanisms used to fund them normally complicates the argument. 
 Scientific tribe members tend to like to use agencies ('research councils') like 
the ERC that they themselves govern and where all members of the republic of 
science are free to make proposals on any subject they like from which their 
scientific peers select the most excellent.  Such researcher-initiated, 'curiosity-
driven' research tends to be described as 'basic' – even though in fact some of 
it is applied and there are many other mission-orientated channels that fund 
research that is fundamental in nature.   
In this Chapter, we first draw attention to a repeating pattern in which the 
‘basic research’ community lobbies for resources, either without considering 
the systemic role of basic research or by asserting that basic research is all that 
matters.  Next we discuss the cognitive meaning of ‘basic research’ and point 
out that to conflate the cognitive and governance meanings of ‘basic research’ 
is illegitimate. We explain that the terms of the social contract between science 
and society have been shifting against the ‘basic research’ community – a 
possible explanation for its continuing need to lobby for resources.  Finally, we 
consider strengths and weaknesses of mission-driven versus researcher-driven 
research funding and draw conclusions.   
2.1 Renewed demands and claims 
Periodically, the argument is proposed (more or less seriously) that policy 
should re-focus on funding excellent basic research and that given such 
funding the rest of the research and innovation system will pretty much take 
care of itself.  There have been extreme variants of this argument – such as the 
proposal in a Swedish Green Paper in 19982 to stop funding innovation and to 
 
 
2 Slutbetänkande av Kommittén för översyn av den svenska forskningspolitiken (Forskning 2000), Stockholm, 1998 - 
Final report of the Committee to Review Swedish Research Policy (Research 2000)  
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give all the money to the universities – an idea with which the government 
flirted for a while but then rejected.   
The UK Royal Society3 (in effect, the UK’s academy of science) recently 
produced a more balanced argument in favour of basic research funding as an 
attempt to head off likely funding cuts in the wake of the financial crisis.  It 
places basic research in the context of innovation and competitiveness but 
even this assumes rather than explains a link from basic research to 
competitiveness.   
More frequently, the applied research and innovation side of the coin is simply 
ignored and an argument is laid out for increasing money for basic/excellent 
research.  A conspicuous recent European example is the ‘Aarhus Declaration’ 
at a conference organised in connection with the Danish EU Presidency with 
the apparent purpose of influencing the development of research funding 
policy at the European level, specifically in Horizon 2020.   
The Excellence 2012 conference declared 
It is essential that Europe strengthens its science base, with 
excellence as the guiding principle. In order to be recognised as 
an attractive partner and a competitive area for research, 
innovation and higher education in a global knowledge-based 
economy. 
To achieve this, the declaration goes on to say that it is necessary to use 
unbureaucratic, non-thematic instruments and let the very best researchers 
evolve and pursue the research ideas they are most intrigued by. Europe 
should be the scene for scientific breakthroughs that open up for unforeseen 
opportunities for humankind. Research excellence has, time and again, 
changed our lives and our thinking. Excellence remains essential to the future 
of Europe. Excellence is the essential foundation that secures the development 
and availability of human capital to meet the needs of the future4.   
Such claims by the basic research lobby have traditionally been founded on 
two ideas.  
First, there was a linear assembly line model of innovation (basic 
research leading to applied research leading to product 
development). It is commonly attributed to Vannevar Bush, 
though it is also a somewhat distorted picture of his real views. 
Second, there was the idea of the unpredictability of the eventual 
applied spin-offs from basic research. Taken together, these two 
 
 
3 Royal Society, The Scientific Century: Securing Our Future Prosperity, London: Royal Society, 2010 
4 The Aarhus Declaration: Investing in Excellence – Preparing for Tomorrow, University of Aarhus, 2012 
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notions justified governmental support of basic research without 
an initial evaluation of its potential societal benefits. If basic 
research is the fountainhead of societal innovation, and if it is 
unpredictable which basic research will lead when to what (if 
any) societal benefits, a wide array of basic science projects … 
should be sponsored without initial regard for applicability.5 
Rejecting any consideration of impacts in research funding effectively means 
rejecting any sort of thematic prioritisation, leaving quality or ‘excellence’ as 
the only usable funding criterion.  Thus Helga Nowotny (President of the 
European Research Council – ERC) roundly rejected the idea of imposing an 
‘impact’ agenda on the ERC at its recent fifth anniversary conference.  She 
admitted that this approach created an "inherent tension" with "the demands 
of policymakers for practical innovation, seen as the undisputed motor 
of...economic growth ... One answer is to target resources...to look to strategic 
sectors, to put science to work on the most pressing problems … But frontier 
science does not work like this. We cannot programme scientific 
breakthroughs or order them from a menu... We can’t foresee the 
consequences of what we discover."6 
While, as we go on to show, these one-sided ‘pitches’ for basic research fly in 
the face of many years of research policy research and rely on the long-
discredited idea of a linear relationship from basic research to societal impact, 
they reappear frequently.  Basic research does indeed play a lot of important 
roles in the national research and innovation system.  Understanding these is 
key to a more balanced and holistic research policy.   However, understanding 
the needed role of ‘basic research’ in the mix of research funding is hard 
because (a) cognitively the term has many meanings and is often used in a 
variety of imprecise ways while (b) it has highly politicised meanings in the 
governance and funding of science.    
2.2 Understanding ‘basic’ research in cognitive terms  
In terms of a cognitive definition, we are used to distinguishing between three 
components of R&D 
 Fundamental research: work undertaken primarily for the advancement of 
scientific knowledge, without a specific practical application in view 
 Applied research: work undertaken primarily for the advancement of 
scientific knowledge, with a specific practical aim in view 
 
 
5 Lewis Branscomb, Gerald Holton and Gerhard Sonnert, Science for Society: Cutting-edge basic research in the 
service of public objectives: A blueprint for an intellectually bold and socially beneficial science policy, Report on 
the November 2000 Conference on Basic Research in the Service of Public Objectives, available at 
http://www.cspo.org/products/reports/scienceforsociety.pdf 
6 Times Higher Education Supplement (THES), 8 March 2012 
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 Development: the use of the results of fundamental and applied research 
directed to the introduction of useful materials, devices, products, systems 
and processes, or the improvement of existing ones7  
This is the definition the OECD uses for the collection of international R&D 
statistics.  The distinction between fundamental and applied research is quite 
odd.  It literally means that the same piece of research can be applied if the 
researcher knows why she or he is doing it and fundamental if not.  These days 
the OECD tends to refer to ‘basic’ rather than ‘fundamental’ research but the 
meaning is the same.  Godin, not unreasonably, argues that the idea of ‘basic’ 
research would have been dropped as incoherent a long time ago were it not 
for the fact that most of the developed world is committed to collecting 
statistics about it8.   
Alternative definitions have been attempted.  One recurring idea is that basic 
research produces knowledge that is general.  Applied research is needed in 
order to build on that knowledge in ways that make it ready to apply it to 
particular situations, such as the development of a specific product9.   
One powerful (but unresearched) idea is that progress in fundamental 
research opens up new territory within which applied researchers and 
innovators can then create value.  Some, like Geim who recently shared the 
Nobel Prize for research on graphene, argue10 that over the longer term 
slowing the rate of investment in basic research will reduce the rate of 
innovation and therefore economic development and growth, as the economic 
potential of the new ‘seam’ of knowledge is gradually worked out.  
Research on the nature of 'basic research' shows that the concept means 
different things in different sciences and to different actors.  Nonetheless, the 
idea of basic research is meaningful to the bulk of the scientific community.  In 
a rare study of the subject, Calvert and Martin interviewed 49 UK and US 
researchers to explore how they meant and used the term.  Figure 1 
summarises the responses. 
Two-thirds of the researchers went along with the definition based on intent 
but as many thought there was something specific about the character of the 
knowledge that distinguished it from other research, ie that it in some ways 
 
 
7 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities: 
Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development (Frascati Manual), DAS/PD/62.47, Paris: 
OECD, 1962 
8 Benoît Godin, ‘Measuring science: is there “Basic Research” without statistics?’ Social Science Information, 42 (1), 
57-90 
9 Keith Pavitt, ‘What makes basic research economically useful?’ Research Policy, 20, 1991, 109-119; Mario di Marchi 
and Giovanni Napolitano, ‘Some revised definitions of Aplied Research and Experimental Development’, Science 
and Public Plicy, 20 (4), 1993, 281-284 
10 Financial Times, 5 January, 2012 
7
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provides foundations for other kinds of knowledge.  One third of the 
researchers emphasised distance from application as a defining characteristic.  
Three essentially regarded only physics as basic research, perhaps harking 
back to the logical positivist school of philosophy of 100 years ago, which 
maintained that all knowledge is reducible to physics.  For them, the existence 
of ‘sciences of the artificial’11 such as information theory that describe 
fundamental phenomena in artefacts that do not exist in nature (e.g. 
computers) would presumably pose a problem.   
Figure 1 Researchers’ Definitions of ‘Basic Research’ 
Criteria for distinction No. interviewees 
Epistemological 33 
Intentional 32 
Distance from application 15 
Institutional 8 
Disclosure norms 7 
Scientific field 3 
Note: Total number of interviewees = 49 
Source: Jane Calvert and Ben Martin, Changing Conceptions of Basic Research? Background Document 
for the Workshop on Policy Relevance ad Measurement of Basic Research, Oslo 29-30 October 2001, Sussex 
University: SPRU, 2001 
"Basic science"— curiosity-driven research without regard to applicability —
usually carries a higher prestige than "applied science"; and even a certain 
snobbery of the basic toward the applied scientist can sometimes be 
observed12.  The argument appears, for example, in the evaluation of Finnish 
participation in the Fifth Framework Programme, with sections of the 
scientific community effectively arguing that the FP is low quality because it 
tends not to involved basic research13.   
Stokes has shown that a lot of what we commonly call 'basic' research is not 
'blue skies' or curiosity driven but is rather pursued with the explicit aim of 
solving problems (Figure 2).  He cites Niels Bohr as a leading and productive 
example of pure, curiosity-driven research.  Bohr’s Quadrant is important, 
both because curiosity about fundamental things has a cultural value and 
because it often turns out to produce useful results as well.  And it is certainly 
a good training school, as the wealth of socially and economically useful work 
that physicists do in other fields amply illustrates.14  Stokes is a bit derisive 
about Edison’s Quadrant – pure applied research – saying that Edison 
 
 
11 Herbert A Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd edition, MIT Press, 1996 
12 JD Bernal, The Social Function of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967, first published 1939 
13 Pirjo Niskanen, Finnish Universities and the EU Framework Programme – Towards a New Phase, VTT Technology 
Studies, Helsinki: VTT, 2001 
14 Keith Sequeira and Ben Martin, Physics and Industry, Brighton: SPRU, 1996 
  
 8 
ruthlessly avoided fundamental explanations of scientific phenomena, 
focusing always on invention based on the existing state of scientific 
knowledge.  Yet this is where the bulk of industrial R&D lives.  While the basic 
research community likes to equate ‘basic’ with ‘blue skies’ or ‘curiosity-driven’ 
research, Stokes’ important contribution is to remind us of ‘Pasteur’s 
Quadrant’ – use-inspired basic research – which has huge economic and 
scientific importance.  He argues that very large amounts of ‘basic’ research 
properly belong in this quadrant rather than Bohr’s.   
Figure 2 Sources of Research Inspiration 
 
Source: Donald Stokes, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation, Washington 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997 
In economic terms, knowledge is a ‘non-rival’ good – meaning that many 
people can consume it at the same time.  Most goods, for example cake, are 
‘rival’.  If I eat the cake, then you cannot.  Knowledge is one of the special cases 
where you can have your cake and eat it, too.  Knowledge is also ‘non-
excludable’ – it is hard to stop people getting access to it.  Non-excludable, 
non-rival goods are ‘public goods’.  In economic theory, the results of basic 
research are such public goods (though there are also other categories of 
public goods).  In theory the market cannot produce these, so since we need 
them the state must pay.  Thus, basic research in universities is fully funded 
while work intended to lead more directly to industrial applications is typically 
funded privately, or may be cost-shared between the state and industry when 
risks and potential spillovers are high.   
We could on this basis propose a definition of basic research as ‘research that 
industry will not fund’.  One of the problems with this approach is that 
industry has historically shown that it will fund an amount of research that is 
basic (in the sense of being general, far from application and hard to 
9
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appropriate) when that is the only way to solve a particular problem or when 
there appears to be a good chance of appropriating enough of the benefits to 
justify the investment – for example through first-mover advantage rather 
than more permanently monopolising research results15. OECD statistics 
suggest that basic research formed some 3% of company R&D activities in the 
late 1980s and had risen to about 5% by 2009.   
Figure 3 Funding of Basic Research, USA, 1953 – 1984 
 
Source: National Science Foundation, charted from David C Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology 
and the Pursuit of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1989 
US data suggest that basic research may have made up a greater proportion of 
industry R&D in an earlier period.  A survey of US R&D performing companies 
in 1951 found that they spent 8% of their internal R&D budget on basic 
research16.  Figure 3 shows that in terms of basic research funding, industry’s 
contribution was even higher in the past.  Historically, at least in the USA, 
industry performed a very significant proportion of basic research – it is only 
in more recent times that this has tended to become the preserve of the 
universities.   
The related issue is not only who makes knowledge, but also how they do so 
– and in particular how the production process is governed.  Gibbons and 
colleagues17 have brought together a lot of thinking about this in a distinction 
 
 
15 Nathan Rosenberg, ‘Why do firms do basic research (with their own money)?’ Research Policy, 19 (2), 1990, 165-
174 
16 RN Anthony, Selected Operating Data: Industrial Research Laboratories, Harvard Business School, Division of 
Research, 1951; cited from Benoît Godin, ‘Research and development: how the “D” got into R&D’, Science and 
public Policy, 33 (1), 2006, 59-76 
17 Michael Gibbons, Camilla Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Schwartzman, S., Scott P. and Trow, M., The New 
Production of Knowledge, London: Sage, 1994 
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between the two modes of knowledge production shown in Figure 4. This is a 
simplification of a complex reality, but one that gives us some useful concepts 
for tackling policy and research administration.  
Figure 4 Mode 1 and Mode 2 Knowledge Production 
Mode 1 Mode 2 
Problems set and solved in the context of the 
(academic) concerns of the research community 
Problems set and solved in the context of application 
Disciplinary Transdisciplinary 
Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
Hierarchical, tending to preserve existing forms of 
organisation 
Heterarchical, involving more transient forms of 
organisation 
Internal quality control Quality control is more socially accountable 
 
Mode 1 (Figure 4) is disciplinary science, and can often be basic science, 
though applied science can be done in Mode 1, too.  Its logic comes from its 
internal organisation and control mechanisms.  Its institutions tend to be 
centralised and stable.  In terms of education, Mode 1 tends to provide ‘basic 
training’ and a disciplinary ‘entry ticket’ (such as a PhD) for people to qualify 
as credible researchers in either Mode.  However, Mode 1 is not the same as 
‘basic science.’  Research that is in some sense fundamental or long-term can 
be done in either Mode.   
Mode 2 includes not only the practice of applied science in universities and 
other research institutions but also the generation of research-based 
knowledge elsewhere in society.  Mode 2 work tends to be transient.  It forms 
and re-forms around applications problems.  Calling on different disciplines 
and locations at different times, it is hard to centralise.  Since Mode 2 work is 
performed in an applied, social context, it is normally subject to social and 
economic evaluation, and not solely to traditional quality reviews by scientific 
peers.  To the occasional irritation of those used to the Mode 1 tradition, this 
means that relatively frequent evaluation – in part by non-scientists – is 
normal in Mode 2 work, and has become part of the new social contract 
between scientific researchers and society.18    
The sharp distinction between Mode 1 and 2 can make it seem as if they are 
alternatives.  Many researchers, however, do both, so they take closely related 
research problems to different research agencies to ask for funding.  Thus, 
coordination between theory- and problem-driven research often takes place 
at the level of researchers and research groups.  Gibbons and colleagues also 
get their history wrong, claiming that Mode 2 is new.  In fact, it is Mode 1 that 
 
 
18 Ben Martin, Ammon Salter et al, The Relationship Between Publicly Funded Basic Research and 
Economic Performance, report to HM Treasury, Brighton: Science Policy Research Unit, 1996 
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is historically new, while Mode 2 is the traditional form of science, as practised 
for many hundreds of years19. 
2.3 Defining ‘basic research’ in governance terms  
‘Basic research’ in the governance sense is important (a) because it connects to 
the idea of academic freedom and (b) because it relates to who steers the 
allocation of resources and therefore the ability of the individual researcher to 
follow her or his personal research trajectory.   
The right of academics to say things unpalatable to church and government 
involves a battle going back hundreds of years that is well beyond the scope of 
this paper.  However, in the European university tradition, the emergence of 
‘Humboldtian’ universities in the early nineteenth century marked the 
legitimisation of the role of universities in research as well as in teaching and 
the principle that university teachers’ academic freedom consists not only in 
saying what they want but also in researching what they want.  As long as 
research was cheap and could be done without external funding, this was not 
very contentious and the scope of university research could be increased 
through patronage. Alexander von Humboldt himself was a man of 
considerable independent means who paid for most of his research 
expeditions out of his own pocket.  
Societal influence over the direction of university research began to be applied 
in the nineteenth century through the innovation of ‘land-grant colleges’ in the 
USA, where the state granted land to build universities for agriculture, 
engineering and technology20.  In this parallel tradition research was highly 
influenced by societal needs and was later driven in other mission-orientated 
directions by external state funding21.  In 1939, JD Bernal famously moved this 
idea of societal influence over science from the descriptive to the normative, 
proposing that governments should use science for social ends through 
selectively funding some areas but not others22.   
Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report Science, the Endless Frontier23 was an explicit 
rejection of the Bernalian view. Bush – himself one of the architects of nuclear 
weapons – was a member of a generation of scientists that was horrified by the 
recruitment of science into the military service of society and who wanted to 
pull back from the societal role of science – whether as fascist science, socialist 
 
 
19 Benoit Godin, Writing performative history: the new new Atlantis?, Social Studies of Science, vol 28, 1998, pp 465–
483 
20 David Noble, America by Design, OUP, 1979 
21 David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989 
22 JD Bernal, The Social Foundations of Science, London: RKP, 1939 
23 Vannevar Bush, Science, the endless frontier: a report to the president on a program for postwar scientific 
research National Science Foundation, 1945. 
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science or science in the service of the Allies in World War II.  Bush’s report 
proposed not only to create a new funding institution for research but that 
members of the community appointed by the President – not those 
responsible for societal missions such as health or defence –should govern 
that institution, arguing that “Scientific progress on a broad front results from 
the free play of free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the 
manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown. Freedom of 
inquiry must be preserved under any plan for Government support of science.” 
His manifesto for post-war science was basic science and he argued that 
increasing science funding would automatically increase product and process 
innovation and therefore national competitiveness as well as military 
preparedness.  It seems odd to those of us who have lived with the term all our 
lives, but the idea of ‘basic research’ is therefore a rather new construct – “a 
rhetorical creation on the part of scientists anxious to justify their social 
position.”24 
For five years after Vannevar Bush delivered his report to the President, there 
was debate about how to fund research.  Bush wanted most government-
funded research to be financed through a researcher-governed organisation 
but one by one the main ‘missions’ of government were taken out of the 
discussion.  Finally, the National Science Foundation was created to fund 
researcher-initiated research under a system of governance ‘owned’ by the 
scientific community.  Most Western countries had and still have similar 
‘research council’ arrangements in parallel with mechanisms to fund ‘mission’ 
orientated research.  These institutions channel only a small proportion of 
total government spending on R&D but they are in practice controlled to a 
large degree by the scientific community.   
What emerged in the post-war years was a ‘social contract’ that gave the 
scientific community a high degree of control in running the ‘basic’ science 
funding system, bolstered by the ‘linear model’ idea that there was an 
automatic connection between doing basic, researcher-initiated research and 
social and economic welfare, just as Bush claimed.  The essence of that social 
contract was that “The political community agrees to provide resources to the 
scientific community and to allow the scientific community to retain its 
decision-making mechanisms and in turn expects forthcoming but unspecified 
benefits.”25 To some degree, this social contract is forced upon the political 
community because it lacks the skills and knowledge needed to manage the 
details of science.  Instead it hands over that management to the scientific 
community, despite the problems inherent in such a ‘principal-agent’ 
 
 
24 Michael Gibbons, Camilla Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Schwartzman, S., Scott P. and Trow, M., The New Production 
of Knowledge, London: Sage, 1994 
25 DH Guston, Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000 
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relationship where the principal lacks the ability to test the agent’s honesty 
and effectiveness26.  The degree to which the scientific community formally 
governs basic research funders varies.  In Sweden, the research community 
elects the majority of the governing board members.  In most other countries 
the control is less overt than this but the scientific community nonetheless 
makes most if not all of the specific funding allocation decisions.   
During the 1960s and the 1970s, there grew up once again a more active desire 
to harness science – and especially technology – to societal needs, leading to 
the creation of innovation agencies, innovation-focused industry policies and 
other new ideas such as grands projets aiming to shift control more towards 
society.  The OECD was instrumental in establishing the legitimacy of what it 
called ‘science policy’.  In 1963, a working group led by Christopher Freeman 
(a great admirer of JD Bernal and who later founded the Science Policy 
Research Unit at Sussex University and introduced the idea of ‘national 
systems of innovation’) produced the Frascati Manual27, which defined how to 
collect R&D statistics.  The same year, the OECD organised the first 
international meeting of ministers of science and two years later it established 
a committee and an internal department for science policy, led by Jean-
Jacques Salomon, which promoted the idea of a ‘technology gap’ between the 
USA and the rest of the world, which justified the need for science policy.  The 
‘OECD line’ came to be that  
1. Research should help reach national, politically-determined goals 
2. Research should be planned and organised to that end 
3. Research should be more interdisciplinary, in order to solve real-world 
problems  
4. The universities were rigid, organised by discipline and unable to change 
themselves.  They should be ‘reorganised’ in order to contribute more to 
the solution of societal problems and to reach national goals28 
The increased state R&D budgets had high mission content and new 
terminologies such as ‘strategic research’29 and ‘targeted research’30 began to 
emerge.  The continued roll-out of the ‘new public management’ has arguably 
 
 
26 D Braun, ‘Lasting tensions in research policymaking– a delegation problem,’ Science and Public Policy, 30 (5) 2003, 
309-321; B van der Meulen, ‘Science policies as principal-agent games: Institutionalisation and path dependency in 
the relation between government and science, ‘ Research Policy 27 (4), 1998, 397-414 
27 Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development, Paris: OECD, 1963 
28 Edgeir Benum, ‘Et nytt forskningspolitisk  regime? Grunnforskningen, OECD og Norge 1965-72’, Historisk tidsskrift, 
86 (4), 2007, 551-574 
29 J Irvine and BR Martin, Foresight in Science: Picking the Winners, London: Frances Pinter: 1984; Arie Rip, ‘Strategic 
research, post-modern universities and research training,’ Higher Education Policy, 17 (2) 2004, 153-066 
30 A Elzinga, ‘The science-society contract in historical transformation: with special reference to ‘epistemic drift’,’ 
Social Science Information, 36 (3) 1997, 411-455 
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reinforced the trend for this drift to continue31, noticeably through the 
introduction of ‘performance-based research funding systems’32 that count 
scientific and non-scientific research outputs and towards new funding 
practices among UK research councils that ask researchers to predict (and in 
the Research Excellence Framework to demonstrate) the societal impact of 
their work.  In short, the terms of the social contract have shifted sharply 
against the ‘basic research’ community’s traditional values. Unsurprisingly, 
that community is largely not in favour of this development.   
This shift in the social contract is likely to be one of the reasons that – when 
the mission-orientated and traditional scientific communities interact, and 
certainly when they lobby for resources – they can appear as 'two tribes' with 
different cultures, values and goals.  The position of the ‘basic research tribe’, 
however, is not only built on its desire to govern research funding but also 
touches on the older, raw nerve of academic freedom.   
While Sweden is one of the places where the battle between the two tribes is 
noisiest, it is also the place where the need for all the different styles was most 
clearly and early recognised, when a new innovation agency (Styrelsen för 
Teknisk Utveckling – STU) was set up in 1968 to act as a 'change agent' and 
combat the stagnation in national research identified by the OECD review of 
Swedish science policy in 1964.  STU came to argue that Sweden needed the 
conventional research councils to fund bottom-up research and to foster 
excellence across a very wide range of disciplines in order to keep the 
university teachers current, make sure the foreigners could not fool the 
Swedes, and to ensure that any field that proved promising could quickly be 
expanded, based on the human capital already in place.  This it called 
'Programme 2'.  STU saw its own role as 'Programme 1': funding research 
activity in the parts of the system that underpinned industrial and other 
societal needs – connecting non-academic actors like the major Swedish 
companies with the academic research community and making sure that 
enough knowledge and people were generated in the areas of contact between 
the scientific and other societal systems.  Note that the idea of 'basic research' 
was not part of the discussion: the research to be done was the research that 
was needed, irrespective of its nature.  
 
 
31 Laurens K Hessels, Harro van Lente and Ruud Smits, ‘In search of relevance: the changing contract between 
science and society,’ Science and Public Policy, 36 (5) 2009, 387-401 
32 Katherine Barker, ‘The UK Research Assessment Exercise: the evolution of a national research evaluation system,’ 
Research Evaluation 16 (1) 2007 3-12; OECD 2011; Diana Hicks, ‘Performance based university research funding 
systems’, Research Policy, 41 (4) 2011, 251-261; Erik Arnold, Fritz Ohler, Barbara Good Brigitte Tiefenthaler and Niki 
Vermeulen, The Quality of Research, Institutional Funding and Research Evaluation in the Czech Republic and 
Abroad, Annexe 3 to the final report of the International Audit of Research, Development and Innovation in the 
Czech Republic, Prague: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, 2011 
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Figure 5 Programme 1 and Programme 2 
 
Making a judgment about the respective virtues of politically governed mission 
orientated research and researcher-governed research is complicated by 
differences in evaluation traditions.  Mission-orientated research tends, 
reasonably enough, to be evaluated in terms of its impacts.  It is done in order 
to change things in society, so evidence of such change is logically the main 
interest of the evaluator.  A check on scientific quality is often done – whether 
by peer review, bibliometric or other means – but this is inherently a 
secondary consideration.  Researcher-initiated research is generally funded on 
the basis of its scientific quality; its relevance to societal needs is considered at 
best stochastic and at worst uninteresting.  It seems highly likely that the UK 
style of trying to establish the ‘relevance’ even of rather fundamental research 
will steer the system towards work of short-term usefulness at the cost of long-
term applicability let alone knowledge generation.   
What we do know is that the researcher-governed style has weaknesses as well 
as strengths 
 The exclusive use of peer review promotes conservative decision making, 
tending to lead to the funding of ‘normal’ rather than radical science – thus 
an increasing number of research councils are experimenting with ‘high 
risk’ funding instruments.  
 It tends to favour the old over the young – hence, equally, the proliferation 
of ‘young researcher’ schemes among research councils.  (The recent 
evaluation of the National Science Foundation of China showed that most 
winners of the ‘Distinguished Young Scholar’ grants were just below the 
age limit33) 
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 It tends to lead to reproduction of existing structures and specialisations 
rather than promoting change and restructuring of the scientific base34 
 Governance of research-funding organisations by researchers also appears 
to have unfortunate effects.  The Sandström report35, evaluating the 
Swedish research and innovation funding agencies points out that 
researcher governance prevented the comparatively new Swedish Science 
Council from acting as change agency in science funding; instead it 
conserved the pre-existing spending pattern.  Sandström also showed that 
the two other Swedish researcher-governed research councils (FAS and 
FORMAS, whose task is to fund a mixture of mission-orientated and 
researcher-initiated projects) were prevented by the dominance of 
researchers on their governing bodies from performing their mission-
orientated roles.    
The same is of course true of mission-orientated funding.  Depending on the 
specific governance style, it can also ‘lock in’ research funding to existing 
structures, themes and beneficiaries36.  Ramping up capacity to do mission-
orientated research can involve a period when the researchers produce less, or 
work of a lower quality, than at the point where the research community is 
mature (see, for example, the comparatively low but improving quality of 
research in the rapidly-expanding Chinese science system in Not only the 
volume but also the quality (measured as a bibliometric Relative Impact 
Indicator) of Chinese publications has been increasing. However, it remains 
somewhat below the world average (Figure 21).   
Figure 21In Sweden, the decision dramatically to increase energy R&D as a 
response to the Oil Price Shock of 1973 led to a period when many people new 
to the field were finding their feet – and prompted a storm of criticism from 
other parts of the scientific community, to the effect that the state should not 
invest in poor science but should have added it to university core funding or let 
the research councils distribute the money in the usual way – and by 
implication not specifically to energy research.   
Mission-orientated funders are normally trying to do a more complex 
optimisation than solely on quality, making their decisions prone to error 
(especially if judgments are needed about markets) – one consequence of 
which has been a shift in funding style within many organisations from 
focusing on single beneficiaries towards networks, clusters and portfolios.  The 
Framework Programme has probably led the way in funding a mixture of 
 
 
34 Arie Rip, ‘Aggregation machines – a political science of science approach to the future of the peer review system’, 
in Matthijs Hisschemöller, Rob Hoppe, William Dunn and Jerry Ravetz (eds), Knowledge, Power and Participation in 
Environmental Policy Analysis, Policy Studies Review Annual No 12, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001 
35 Madeleine Sandström, Forskningsfinansiering – kvalitet och relevans, Stockholm, SOU 2008:30 
36Rajneesh Narula, Globalisation and Technology, Oxford: Polity Press, 2003; Hans Weinberger, 
Nätverksentreprenören, Stockholm: KTH, 1997 
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fundamental and more applied effort within a single programme and through 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology.  This is also to a 
growing extent being done at national level, both through ‘competence centres’ 
programmes that build long-term academic/industry consortium relationships 
spanning basic and applied research and in thematic programmes at the 
national level.   
2.4 Conclusion 
The balance of effort between basic and applied research is an important 
question not only so that we can understand and improve the ways we 
generate knowledge and relate it to societal needs but also because it has 
become a shorthand for the allocation of resources between different 
stakeholder groups.  
The economics of research imply that the state has to be the major funder of 
basic research and more generally of research that produces public goods.  
While some members of the scientific community like to assert that leaving 
that community itself to decide to whom to allocate research funding is the 
most effective way to achieve societal benefits, there is no evidence to support 
such a claim.  Basic research is done both based on such research-council style 
funding and in connection with mission-driven R&D.  Most countries maintain 
parallel systems for funding researcher-initiated and mission R&D.  This is a 
rational response to the fact that both styles of funding and governance have 
advantages and drawbacks.   
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3. How does science relate to innovation? 
Many people like to discuss technology as if it were a consequence of science.  
Historically, however, technology came first, after a time prompting scientific 
investigation, so a lot of science is prompted by societal need.  Science and 
research more generally become socially useful and play roles in innovation 
where they are coupled to needs and users.  While some see a contradiction 
between doing high quality research and doing relevant research, the evidence 
suggests the opposite.  The major impacts of research – whether basic or 
applied – can take a surprisingly long time to become apparent.   
We first discuss the relationship between technology and science.  Next we talk 
about the relation between science and innovation.  In the third section, we 
discuss the idea that societally relevant research cannot be good research.  
Finally we look at the long-term impacts of basic and applied research.   
3.1 Technology causes science, but is getting more scientific 
There is a long stream of empirical evidence about the role of industry and 
society in shaping the development of science.  An old anecdote is about 
Galileo being commissioned to improve telescope design so as to increase his 
patron’s ability to wage naval war; Galileo then turned the new telescopes on 
the stars and got himself into all sorts of trouble with the Church.  In an 
excellent essay on ‘Marx as a student of technology’, Rosenberg quotes Marx 
and Engels saying that “from the beginning, the origin and development of the 
science has been determined by production”.  Recent work on the patterns of 
industrial and scientific specialisation at the country level does indeed confirm 
that there is a systematic relationship between the two37.  For a range of 
reasons its seems rational to regard this as a result of ‘co-evolution’ of the 
scientific and industrial systems rather than as a result of a strong 
determinism38 but it does also provide evidence that science is not wholly 
independent of society but is to a degree ‘socially constructed’39.   
Technological change has for a long time been understood as a driving force in 
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economic development.  Adam Smith wrote40 of improvements in production 
and the division of labour being driven by  “philosophers or men of 
speculation whose trade it is not to do anything but to observe everything; and 
who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of 
the most distant and dissimilar objects.”  Marx placed the transformation of 
social relations and of technology at the centre of his analysis of capitalism, 
while Schumpeter41 connected technology with the “gale of creative 
destruction” that drove capitalist progress.   
Writing in 1776, Smith’s observation was particularly acute.  He lived in a time 
of dramatic industrial and social change enabled by technological changes 
(notably increased access to coal, the transition from wind and water to steam 
power and developments in the textiles industry) as well as changes in the 
supply of commodities and in markets.  His analysis of pin-making is famous –
 explaining how division of labour and more specialised tools could be used to 
increase productivity while exploiting existing knowledge.  His “philosophers” 
were not scientists in the modern sense but experimenters and his point was 
that in order to improve production you have to stand back from the 
productive process and develop the technologies you use.   
1776 was a good year for technology also because that was when the first 
separately condensing steam engines designed by James Watt entered 
industrial service.  Thomas Savery’s primitive and unwieldy steam pump was 
introduced in the late seventeenth century and was overtaken by Newcomen’s 
more effective ‘atmospheric engine’ in 1712.  Watt’s design was so dramatically 
improved compared with its predecessors that his company lived for quite a 
period by charging customers the price of one-third of the coal they saved 
compared with the earlier technology.   
Watt was a mechanical engineer who learnt some of his skills repairing 
astronomical instruments for the University of Glasgow.  After he became 
interested in steam he was asked to repair the University’s model Newcomen 
engine and began to experiment his way towards a more efficient design.  A 
“philosopher” in Smith’s sense, Watt made technological process through 
experiment and calculation half a century before Sadi Carnot’s book 
Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire42 was published – the event that is 
conventionally seen as the start of the science of thermodynamics.  Carnot’s 
book is all about understanding and enabling others further to improve a 
technology that was, by the time he published, two centuries old.   
 
 
40 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776; reprinted, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974 
41 Joseph A Schumpeter, ‘The instability of capitalism,’ Economic Journal, 38, 1928, pp 361-86 
42 Sadi Carnot, Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu, et sur les machines propres à developer cette puissance, 
Paris: Bachelier, 1824 
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Carnot is a “philosopher” in a second sense.  Working at a greater level of 
abstraction, his science produces much more general results than Watts’ 
experimentation and can be used in many more applications than Watts’ work, 
which was specific to particular engines.  On the other hand, the user of 
Carnot’s ideas requires both a high level of education (for example in 
mathematics) and also the ability to do design.  Thermodynamics does not tell 
you about technology; it tells you things that help you produce technology.  
But it also lets you start the process of innovation from the ‘supply side’.  Now 
you can start with a general idea and see where you can apply it.  Over time, 
our universal impression is that the growth of science and technology as 
research disciplines in their own right have massively increased the 
opportunities for innovation.  By the late nineteenth century, we see the 
emergence of distinct intra-mural R&D laboratories43 as well as a flurry of 
growth in the use of external R&D labs44.  From this point, too, it makes sense 
to start talking about ‘science-based industries’ such as chemicals production 
or ‘technology-based industries’ such as electricals, vehicles and later aircraft.  
The balance of initiative between science and technology on the one hand and 
problem-based innovation within industry varies among industries and over 
time, but it is also reasonably clear that in most industries at least the amount 
of scientific and technological understanding needed in order to do innovation 
is increasing.   
As the number of scientific fields has grown over time, the degree to which 
completely new disciplines are triggered by technological innovation is 
probably reducing but there continue to be areas where technological practice 
runs ahead of – and triggers developments in – science.  Vincenti has 
documented the years of experimental effort the US NACA (predecessor of 
NASA) put into optimising propeller design by parameter variation ahead of 
the development of adequate theory to explain performance45 and later how 
the Bell XS-1 (the aircraft that first broke the sound barrier) was developed by 
experimentation in wind tunnels 5-6 years before even the crudest theoretical 
model of an aerodynamic shape travelling above the speed of sound was 
developed46.  Modern materials science was to a large degree triggered by the 
need better to understand semiconductors for industrial application47.  
Functional genomics is effectively an effort to systematise in a scientific way 
our understanding of what individual genes do, moving beyond the mix of 
practice and science in earlier selective breeding and genetics.  Increasingly, 
 
 
43 Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete, The Economic of Industrial Innovation, (3rd edn), London: Frances Pinter, 1997 
44 David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989 
45 Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How they Know It, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990 
46 Walter Vincenti, ‘Engineering theory in the making” Aerodynamic calculation “breaks the sound barrier”’, 
Technology and Culture, 38(4), 819-851 
47 H Brooks, ‘The relation between science and technology’, Research Policy, 23, 477-486, 1994 
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science and technology co-evolve, as the examples of tissue engineering48 and 
digital mobile telephony49 show.   
3.2 How science relates to innovation 
Research on research and innovation has considerably improved our 
understanding of the role of science and technology in innovation during the 
past half century – even if that understanding is not always best used in 
policymaking, where the crude ‘linear model’ of innovation remains 
surprisingly influential.  By the 1950s and 1960s the historical pattern of 
problems in technology prompting the development of science (as with 
thermodynamics) was all but forgotten and there developed a strong belief in a 
‘linear model’ of innovation leading from science to wealth production. From 
the late 1960s, however, thanks to writers such as Carter and Williams50, 
Schmookler51 and Myers and Marquis52, more emphasis came to be placed on 
the role of the marketplace in innovation, suggesting a linear model where 
market needs ‘pull’ knowledge out of research and into application.   
A key weakness of the linear models is a failure to conceptualise how the links 
between successive stages of innovation are supposed to work. They also focus 
solely on the relationship between new knowledge and innovation.  By the late 
1970s, Mowery and Rosenberg53 largely laid the intellectual argument between 
push and pull to rest by stressing the importance of coupling between 
science, technology and the marketplace.  Recent models of the relation 
between innovation and research posit a more or less sequential process 
linking science with the marketplace (via engineering, technological 
development, manufacturing, marketing and sales), but with the addition of a 
number of feedback loops and variations over time in the primacy of ‘push’ 
and ‘pull’ mechanisms.  Figure 6 shows an example of such a model.   
Key to this new perspective is understanding the huge importance of the stock 
of existing knowledge.  As, for example, the Community Innovation Survey 
(and other innovation surveys outside Europe that use a similar methodology) 
consistently show, the vast majority of the knowledge used in innovation 
comes out of this stock, and is not created afresh in the project that gives rise 
to the innovation.   
 
 
48 Fiona Murray, ‘Innovation as co-evolution of scientific and technological networks: exploring tissue engineering’, 
Research Policy, 31, 1389-1403, 2002 
49 Erik Arnold, Barbara Good and Henrik Segerpalm, Effects of research on Swedish Mobile Telephone 
Developments: The GSM Story, VA 2008:04, Stockholm, VINNOVA, 2008 
50 Carter, C. and Williams, B., Industry and Technical Progress, Oxford University Press, 1957 
51 Schmookler, J., Invention and economic growth, Harvard University  press, 1966 
52 Myers, S. and Marquis, D.G., Successful Industrial Innovation, National Science Foundation, 1969 
53 Mowery, D.C. and Rosenberg, N., ‘The Influence of Market Demand upon Innovation: A Critical Review of Some 
Recent Empirical Studies’, Research Policy, April 1978 
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Figure 6 Modern ‘Coupling’ Model of Innovation 
 
Source: Modified from Roy Rothwell, ‘Towards the Fifth-generation Innovation Process’, International 
Marketing Review, 11 (1), 1994, 7-31 
Modern models of innovation suggest that applied and more fundamental 
research are interlinked and interdependent as precursors of innovation; that 
the impulse to innovation can start anywhere from user need to fundamental 
discovery; that the presence of customers or users is a necessary condition for 
successful innovation; and that innovations only happen when there are good 
linkages among the actors and types of knowledge needed.  A failure to 
connect research to areas of societal and industrial need has been suggested as 
the reason for the 'European paradox'54: namely, that Europe does a 
comparatively large amount of basic research but is able to get comparatively 
little industrial innovation and economic growth out of it.  If there is 
‘information asymmetry’ among actors in this process – that is, if lack of 
information means opportunities for innovation are untaken – then there is an 
opportunity for policy to promote innovation and growth by coordinating and 
strengthening information links.  At the European level, this has so far been 
one of the important roles of the Framework Programme55.   
Innovation models tend to focus on ideas or information but it has long been 
recognised that people are the key ‘vectors’ of knowledge and an absolute 
requirement for absorbing and using it56.  In recent years, research on research 
has become more explicit about the role and importance of networks among 
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Group Report on Key Enabling Technologies, Brussels: European Commission, 2011 
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Research, 2011 
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people: in science in the form of ‘invisible colleges’57 in which leading scientists 
communicate about current research, sharing information ahead of wider 
publication; in innovation in the form of ‘knowledge value collectives’58, 
namely the networks of people in companies, universities, research institutes 
and elsewhere who work with a common set of knowledge.  There is a lot more 
to learn about how such networks function best, but it is clear that they are 
important in both innovation and research and that they combat information 
asymmetries, providing an element of coordination that increases the rate of 
progress. The Framework Programme has dramatically boosted the amount of 
networking within the European R&D communities, both in industry and in 
the research sector, and is therefore likely to have made a significant 
contribution here.   
3.3 Is relevant research bad research? 
When provoked, members of the scientific tribe tend to dismiss non-basic 
research and therefore research funded through mechanisms not wholly under 
scientific control and as being of poor quality.  This proposition is based on a 
tautology: since 'basic', researcher-initiated or 'blue skies' research is selected 
only on the basis of excellence, it must be the case that the use of other criteria 
reduces the quality of the work funded, compared with selecting only based on 
scientific quality.  In fact, the evidence shows that high scientific quality and 
production and high societal relevance measured through outputs like 
patenting tend to go together.   
In many if not most fields, university-industry links improve research 
performance.  A UK study indicates that – except in the special cases of 
patenting and spin-off generation – most academics engage with industry to 
further their research rather than to commercialise their knowledge59.  
Industrial interaction provides important signals about what problems are of 
practical and industrial interest in research terms, as well as often leading to 
the provision of resources60.  In the case of GSM-relevant research in Sweden, 
interaction between the research department of Ericsson Radio and three 
Swedish universities triggered significant growth in research and teaching 
activities, over time providing Ericsson with the R&D manpower it needed to 
take a leading position in mobile communications markets and inducing the 
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number of professors working in relevant areas to grow from 3 to 41 over a 
couple of decades61.   
Recent evidence reveals that there is considerable complementarity between 
patenting and publishing as well as between the former and additional 
mechanisms, notably, joint and contract R&D, consultancy, spin-off and joint 
PhD training. This is the case in technology areas related to chemistry, 
computer science and sub-fields of engineering and physics62. 
The most productive Danish researchers in the life sciences are less sceptical 
than those who do not patent about any negative influence of industrial links 
or patenting on their research63.  Male, tenured and research-grant active US 
researchers are more likely than others to engage in informal technology 
transfer activities with industry64. A survey of Italian academics found that 
those who published most in the scientific literature also patent the most65.  
Norwegian faculty in receipt of industrial funding publish more than other 
researchers66.  Crespi et al67 have shown that publication and patenting are 
complementary activities up to a maximum point, beyond which patents begin 
to substitute for publications.  They have some (weak) evidence that in the 
physical sciences patenting can crowd out other forms of communication with 
industry, notably publication, whereas in computer science and engineering, 
patenting ‘crowds in’ other forms of communication.   
More recent European work focusing on 87 European universities showed that 
larger universities patent disproportionately more than small ones, especially 
where they have medical schools and engineering departments. High levels of 
scientific production and contract research are both conducive to patenting.  
Broadly, therefore, “Top researchers succeed to publish and patent a lot; a 
high patent output does not seem to affect negatively the publication output of 
the most prolific researchers”68.   
 
 
61 Erik Arnold, Barbara Good and Henrik Segerpalm, Effects of research on Swedish Mobile Telephone Developments: 
The GSM Story, VA 2008:04, Stockholm, VINNOVA, 2008 
62 Gustavo Crespi, Pablo D’Este, Roberto Fontana and Aldo Geuna,  The Impact of Academic Patenting on University 
Research and its Transfer, SPRU Electronic working Paper Series No. 178, Sussex University: SPRU, 2008. 
63 P Lotz, MT Larsen and L Davis, “To what effect?  Scientists’ perspectives on the unintended consequences of 
university patenting,” DRUID Conference, 2007 
64 AN Link, DD Siegel and B Bozeman, “A empirical analysis of the propensity of academics to engage in informal 
university technology transfer,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 16 (4), 2007, 641-655 
65 Valentina Tartari and Stefano Breschi, “Set them free: Scientists’ perceptions of benefits and cost of university-
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66 Magnus Gulbrandsen and Jens-Christian Smeby, “The external orientation of university researchers and 
implications for academic performance and management,” Science and Public Policy, 2003 
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25
26
 
 
 25 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that research done with or influenced by 
industry, funded as ‘mission’ research, can be of excellent scientific quality and 
indeed that in many fields ‘relevance’ is associated with higher quality 
research.  For example 
 One bibliometric study shows that articles co-published between 
researchers in academia and industry tend to be published in journals with 
lower impact factors than academic-only publications, but that they receive 
many more citations69 
 A bibliometric study of biotechnology in Italy shows that collaboration 
with industry is associated with a higher rate of citation.  International 
collaboration consistently increases the citation rate70 
 Another Italian study shows that university researchers who cooperate 
with industry have higher productivity and citation rates than their 
colleagues who do not71 
 A third Italian study of patenting in microelectronics shows that industrial 
cooperation increases the rate of both discovery and invention and is 
characterised by high scientific quality72 
 A study of the technical sciences in British universities showed that 
researchers from the best institutions collaborate the most intensively with 
industry73 
 International scientific peer reviews of the 28 ‘competence centres’ in a 
long-term Swedish programme promoting R&D collaboration between 
industrial consortia and industry found consistently high levels of quality, 
with many centres being regarded as among the international leaders in 
their fields74 
 Swedish bibliometric evidence shows that Framework Programme 
participants have better bibliometric performance than their peers in their 
own universities75 
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 Evaluation of FP6 participants confirmed that the programme attracted 
many of the leading scientists in their respective fields76 
3.4 Impacts of basic and applied research  
The world has in important ways changed since Adam Smith was writing.  
There are fewer and fewer kinds of production that do not have some 
association with scientific research.  It has therefore become less obvious than 
it may have been before when and whether basic or applied research plays a 
role.   
Studies have shown that the science-innovation relationship tends to differ 
between branches of industry, with some needing a lot of 'translational' or 
'transfer' science before they can use fundamental research and others being 
able to exploit it in problem-solving more directly.  We have begun to 
recognise the huge importance of the human capital (trained people, especially 
those with PhDs or equivalent experience) in enabling the conduct of R&D in 
industry and more widely in society, as well as in the scientific research sector. 
 Indeed, in many smaller countries it is plausible to argue that the most 
important reason for national funding of basic research is not to produce 
knowledge but to generate the people that give the national research and 
innovation system the 'absorptive capacity' to exploit global science.   
Some of the most interesting evidence about the importance of basic and 
applied research comes from the budget rivalry between the US National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and mission-orientated research in the 1960s.  The 
US Department of Defense commissioned the Hindsight study, which traced 
the research antecedents of a number of weapons systems back for twenty 
years or so and concluded that the underpinning research was largely mission-
orientated in nature.  NSF retorted with the TRACES study, which traced 
backwards for up to fifty years from five important civil innovations and found 
critical connections to basic research.  The unsurprising implication is that 
both sorts of research are at various times needed.  Little more long-term 
tracing research has since been done until the last decade, when a series of 
long-term impact studies in Sweden has found77:   
 VINNOVA and its predecessors have played important roles in identifying, 
defining and growing new areas of needs-driven R&D in a process of 
dialogue with the research and industrial communities.  This would not 
have been achieved had the funding been under the unique control of 
either the research or the industrial community 
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 This has been achieved through a combination of ‘bottom-up’, responsive-
mode funding and programming that permits promising areas to be scaled 
up 
 Programmes need both to be flexible – reflecting the uniqueness and 
adapting to the evolution of each field – and ‘patient’: long programmes 
have greater effects on beneficiaries’ strategies and learning than short 
ones 
 Time constants are constantly under-estimated in R&D funding.  It is not 
uncommon for 10-20 years to elapse before socio-economic effects of any 
size are visible  
 Hence, it is important to avoid the ‘project fallacy’ (i.e.  the idea that the 
contractually-defined project is necessarily a meaningful entity).  Rather, 
longer-term interactions allow beneficiaries to pursue their ‘real projects’ 
and strategies  
 Key effects of funding have been the development of new clusters of 
human capital and organisational learning so as to develop the capacity 
and capabilities of the innovation system, not just to underpin individual 
innovations  
 While in many cases major economic effects have been obtained in large, 
existing companies, the creation of new firms is necessary in order to 
create a varied environment with many opportunities for experimentation 
and learning  
 Since about 1990 (when many of the Swedish multinationals began to 
merge with foreign companies), globalisation has meant that a key aim of 
R&D funding is not to ‘support’ wholly-Swedish companies but to make 
the Swedish innovation system attractive to companies irrespective of their 
nationality or trans-nationality 
 Where R&D programmes address societal needs, they have to connect with 
effective demand (i.e. users willing and able to pay) 
3.5 Conclusions 
History suggests that the idea of science causing technology is wrong: rather, 
technology historically prompts the creation of science.  The two then co-
evolve in a mutually reinforcing system.  As a result, innovation may indeed 
sometimes be triggered by a scientific discovery or observation, but more often 
it is driven by problem-solving – and it is only successful at the point where it 
is linked to users and their needs.  It is not new knowledge that drives 
innovation but the adoption and use of whatever combination of new and old 
knowledge is appropriate to problem solving in a particular case.  It follows 
that we cannot only fund researcher-initiated research if we want science to 
contribute to the solution of societal problems – we need mission-driven 
research as well that focuses effort on problems.  This need not involve any 
sacrifice of scientific quality.  The route from research to societal impact is a 
long one and it is affected by many other factors than the scientific or 
technological content of the research, such as markets and the availability of 
the complementary knowledge needed to solve particular problems.  It follows 
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that mission-related research funding must not only be patient but also be 
sensitive to the context, interacting with people knowledgeable about needs 
and the state of the art in knowledge.  
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4. Basic and applied research at the national level 
Richer countries tend to do more R&D than poorer ones.  Business 
expenditure on R&D becomes increasingly important as incomes rise but 
needs to be supported by increased education and research activity in the 
higher education sector.  Basic research is growing in importance as a function 
of development – advanced countries have to do more basic research because 
their opportunities for imitation decline – and because technologies are 
becoming more ‘scientific’.  However, the most innovative and dynamic 
economies maintain a balance between more fundamental research and 
activities associated with application and development via big mission-driven 
programmes where the state plays a large role.   
First, we look at what national-level R&D statistics can tell us about the 
respective importance of basic and applied research in development.  Next we 
look at how governments spend money on their own research before looking at 
how different kinds of activity are integrated into major mission-driven 
programmes in the USA and China.   
4.1 Evidence from the national level 
Figure 7 GERD/GDP (%) and GDP per head of population (US$), 2009 
 
Source OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
One of the best-known regularities in economic development is that the 
proportion of GDP spent on R&D tends roughly to rise with rising income 
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(Figure 7) 78.  There are important divergences from this norm: for example, 
Italy manages to have a surprisingly high GDP per head of population while 
devoting a comparatively small proportion of GDP to R&D; the inverse is true 
of Sweden.  But since we can observe a rather clear relationship between R&D 
(as a proxy for innovation) and GDP, and since there is plenty of economic 
evidence to show that changes in technology drive a large part of growth in 
productivity and the economy as a whole, policymakers tend to regard this as a 
driving relationship – hence the EU’s continuation of the old ‘Barcelona Goal’ 
of spending 3% of GDP on R&D in the new Europe 2020 strategy.   
In very poor countries, the state tends to be one of a very small number of 
R&D performers.  Hence, poorer countries typically do a high proportion of 
their R&D activity in government and the higher education system.  As 
industrial development proceeds, so industry's R&D effort grows faster than 
that of the state.     
Figure 8 Relative importance of BERD and HERD, 2006-9 
Source OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
Figure 8 shows the relative proportions of Business Expenditure on R&D 
(BERD) and Higher Education Expenditure on R&D (HERD) for a number of 
countries over 2006-9.  It suggests that there is a certain minimal level of 
HERD necessary even at low levels of BERD.  You need universities to train 
people and do research; otherwise business cannot start doing R&D.  There is 
an ‘entry ticket’ to development, meaning that the state has to make the initial 
investment in research and learning. Second, the slope of the fitted line is 
shallow: growth in BERD is faster than growth in HERD.  So once business 
starts doing R&D it still needs the universities to do teaching and research.  
HERD needs to grow in order to support BERD – but not at as fast a rate. In 
European policy, this is reflected in the fact that the 3% goal is made up of 1% 
from the state and 2% from industry.  The interdependence of different parts 
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of the innovation system is underlined by Brusoni and Geuna’s work showing 
that high-performing countries such as the USA and Germany publish strongly 
across all types of research: basic, applied, development and engineering79.    
Because industry does R&D in order to access markets, this means the balance 
of R&D activity at the national level shifts over time increasingly towards 
applied research and experimental development.   The balance of knowledge 
production shifts towards ‘Mode 2’.  
As long as national technologies remain behind the technological frontier, 
companies can operate in 'catch-up' mode and need to be supported by the 
state research infrastructure maintaining significant applied research 
capability.  Once the frontier is reached, however, the way forward is no longer 
defined by earlier developers; companies and countries need to search more 
widely for knowledge and this typically leads to an increase in the proportion 
of fundamental research done, in order to generate or absorb knowledge from 
new directions.  This proportion goes up not only in the research sector but 
also among companies.  We can see this effect both in national R&D statistics 
and in the spending pattern of certain R&D funders at national level. The 
balance of basic and more applied research is very different in different 
circumstances.   
Figure 9 shows the development of basic and applied research and 
experimental development over quite long periods of time in China, Japan and 
the USA.  China’s research and innovation system was largely destroyed by the 
Cultural Revolution and has been re-built almost from scratch. Since the 
opening up of China at the end of the 1970s, developing a well-functioning 
research and innovation system has been a cornerstone of national 
development policy80.  Already in 1978, at a national conference on science 
that launched the reform and opening up of policy for S&T, Deng Xiaoping 
said that, “science and technology are primary productive forces”. The 1985 
Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System81 
stressed the need to orientate S&T development towards economic 
development.  Basic research was seen as a needed component in such an 
environment.  The 1985 Decision launched a series of reforms to decentralise 
and stimulate R&D funding and performance.   
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We can see from the figure that China’s spectacular growth since opening up 
has been built on a massive expansion of the research and innovation system.   
that high-performing countries such as the USA and Germany publish strongly 
across all types of research: basic, applied, development and engineering79.   
Because industry does R&D in order to access markets, this means the balance 
of R&D activity at the national level shifts over time increasingly towards 
applied research and experimental development. The balance of knowledge 
production shifts towards ‘Mode 2’. 
As long as national technologies remain behind the technological frontier, 
companies can operate in 'catch-up' mode and need to be supported by the 
state research infrastructure maintaining significant applied research 
capability. Once the frontier is reached, however, the way forward is no longer 
defined by earlier developers; companies and countries need to search more 
widely for knowledge and this typically leads to an increase in the proportion 
of fundamental research done, in order to generate or absorb knowledge from 
new directions. This proportion goes up not only in the research sector but 
also among companies. We can see this effect both in national R&D statistics 
and in the spending pattern of certain R&D funders at national level. The 
balance of basic and more applied research is very different in different 
circumstances.
Figure 9 shows the development of basic and applied research and 
experimental development over quite long periods of time in China, Japan and 
the USA.  China’s research and innovation system was largely destroyed by the 
Cultural Revolution and has been re-built almost from scratch. Since the 
opening up of China at the end of the 1970s, developing a well-functioning 
research and innovation system has been a cornerstone of national 
development policy80.  Already in 1978, at a national conference on science 
that launched the reform and opening up of policy for S&T, Deng Xiaoping 
said that, “science and technology are primary productive forces”. The 1985 
Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System81
stressed the need to orientate S&T development towards economic 
development.  Basic research was seen as a needed component in such an 
environment.  The 1985 Decision launched a series of reforms to decentralise
and stimulate R&D funding and performance.  
We can see from the figure that China’s spectacular growth since opening up 
has been built on a massive expansion of the research and innovation system.  
79 S Brusoni. and A Geuna, Persistence and Integration: The Knowledge Base of the Pharmaceutical 
industry, in: C. C. Antonelli, D. Foray, G.M.P. Swann and W.E. Steinmueller (Editors), Technical Choice, 
Innovation and Knowledge: Essays in Honour of Paul A. David, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,  2001
80 International Evaluation of Funding and Management of the National Natural Science Foundation of 
China, Beijing: NSFC, 2011
81 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), Decision on the Reform of the Science and 
Technology Management System, March 1985
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Figure 9 Absolute and Relative Development of Research by Type over Time: 
China, Japan, USA 
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators; China Ministry of Science and Technology
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China is now second only to the USA in the number of scientific papers it 
publishes per year.  Growth in basic research has been equally spectacular –
 but it has stuck obstinately at 5% of GERD.  Overall, R&D is extremely focused 
on Development.  There are parts of the system where Chinese science and 
technology are leading edge; but for the most part China still operates in 
catch-up mode, though the OECD advises that the low share of basic research 
will become unsustainable as science and industry move towards the 
frontier82.   
Japan is no longer the technological powerhouse of Asia and growth has 
tended to stagnate, but it remains an immensely successful economy 
internationally.  The higher proportion of basic research testifies to its more 
developed position than that of China – but the basic share has drifted down 
very slowly from 14-15% in the late 1980s to 13% in 2009.  In contrast, the US 
share of basic research has increased from the same level as Japan in the late 
1980s to 19% in 2009 – during which period the USA has continued to 
maintain its global leadership in science, technology and innovation.   
Many countries do not collect data that distinguish between different types of 
R&D.  In Figure 10 we present a view of the division among types for the 
‘average country’ in the basket of developed countries that do provide such 
data.  (We have excluded the former Soviet Bloc countries because their 
expenditure pattern is dominated by the restructuring of their research and 
innovation systems since 1989.  That produces patterns determined by reform 
rather than economic development.)   
Figure 10 Absolute and Relative Development of Research by Type in 2006-9 
for a Basket of Countries 
Source: OECD, Main S&T statistics, R-D expenditure by sector of performance and type of R-D (in Million 
2005 Dollars - Constant prices and PPPs)  Note: Due to gaps in data series, some data are interpolated.  
Data presented on the left are the mean of the percentages for each country considered – they are not 
weighted by the absolute amounts of R&D done in the different countries 
 
 
82 OECD, Reviews of Innovation Policy: China, Paris: OECD, 2007; International Evaluation of Funding and 
Management of the National Natural Science Foundation of China, Beijing: NSFC, 2011 
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Figure 11 shows how the share of basic research has changed over time.  The 
movement among categories during the period is slight: basic research 
nonetheless increases as a percentage from 18.6% in 1989 to 20.2% in 2009.  
Figure 11 Basic Research in the national GERD, 1986-2009 
 Source: OECD, Main S&T Indicators.  Blanks indicate gaps in data. 
Compared with other members of this country basket, US investment in basic 
research has been low in the past but is about the same now.  A striking 
difference is the much greater importance of experimental development 
in the USA and Japan (and China) compared with the other European 
countries in the basket.  If these three countries do especially well in 
innovating new products and processes, it seems that is because they put more 
effort into developing them – irrespective of whether their systems are in 
‘catch-up’ or ‘frontier’ mode.   
Figure 12 broadly suggests that the proportion of country’s GERD that is 
devoted to basic research tends to decline as BERD rises – which is rather 
what one would expect.   
Figure 12  Comparison between Basic Research/GERD and BERD/GDP, 
2006-9 
Source: Calculated from OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
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However, Figure 13 suggests a more complex pattern.  It looks at how the 
values for 2006-9 shown in Figure 12 compare with their equivalents in 1986-
90, illustrating the change for each country as an arrow from the old to the 
new value.  It shows two patterns of development.  In countries where BERD 
has grown, the proportion of GERD devoted to basic research has declined, 
reflecting the changing balance of effort among different types of R&D 
performers.  But in those countries where BERD has not grown, the 
proportion of effort going to basic research has increased.  (In Norway, where 
BERD has shrunk, the balance of effort has also moved towards basic 
research.)  So there seem to be two trends acting: one towards increased 
BERD; the other towards increased basic research intensity – consistent with 
the frequently discussed idea that innovation and technology are becoming 
more ‘scientific’.   
Figure 13 Changes in Importance of Basic Research and BERD, 1986-90 to 
2006-9 
 
Source: Calculated from OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators.   
4.2 Government R&D spending  
If we look at how government spends money on R&D (Government Budget 
Appropriations or Outlays for R&D – GBAORD in the OECD terminology) in 
more recent times, it becomes clear that while most of the funding is mission-
orientated, and spent through agencies with political rather than scientific 
governance, quite a lot of the work funded is basic research.  The OECD 
statistics show that there is a very slight trend for this proportion of basic 
research to increase in the basket of countries discussed above.   
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Defence spending is a major distorting factor when looking at GBAORD 
because some countries spend massively on defence (historically, this is 
especially true of the USA, UK and France) while others do not.  ‘Civil 
GBAORD’ is therefore a better guide to trends. Figure 14 presents the trends 
when looking only at the proportion of mission-orientated funding83 in Civil 
GBAORD.  The proportion of government spending that is mission orientated 
is in all cases strikingly high.  The part of civil GBAORD not shown in the 
figure is the research part of block grant funding for universities and funding 
for general research councils or academies of science.  Governments, then, 
take care to programme most of their R&D spending towards the achievement 
of rather specific goals – spending a considerably smaller proportion of the 
available money on undirected research, in fact, than is proposed in Horizon 
2020.   
Figure 14 Percentage of Oriented Research in Civil GBAORD (selected years 
between 1986 and 2010) 
 
 
Source OECD, Main S&T Indicators, GBAORD. Blanks indicate non-availability of data.  
It does not follow that orientated parts of GBAORD are spent wholly on 
applied research and experimental development.  Sadly, few countries provide 
 
 
83 Mission-orientated funding is for: exploration and exploitation of the earth, environment, exploration and 
exploitation of space, transport, telecommunication and other infrastructures, energy, industrial production and 
technology, health, agriculture, education, culture, recreation, religion and mass media, political and social 
systems, structures and processes. Defence is already excluded since we are looking at civil GBAORD 
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data that show what kind of R&D is done with mission-orientated GBAORD 
money.  
4.3 Missions and basic research in the USA  
Fortunately, the USA does.  More than half of the US government’s national 
R&D budget comprises defence-related R&D and the US Department of 
Defense is the leading department based on size of public R&D expenditures, 
followed by the Department of Health and Human Services (i.e. more than 
20% of the R&D budget is health-related). Space-related R&D accounts for 7% 
with another 7% involving general science. Energy-related R&D constitutes 
less than 2% of the R&D budget as does environmental R&D.84 Figure 15 
shows that a very substantial proportion of US mission-orientated 
expenditures is fundamental in nature.  
Figure 15 Proportion of Basic Research in the main US Departments and 
Agencies involved in R&D funding (1986-2009) 
 
Sources: Technopolis, based on National Science Foundation Division of Science Resources Statistics, 
Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development  
The US research system is large. Policy is fashioned in a decentralised manner 
through the activities of departments and agencies, through budgets, 
roadmaps and planning processes, and through open solicitations in targeted 
areas. For example, the National Science Foundation (NSF) accepts funding 
requests in programme descriptions, announcements and solicitations, plus at 
any time applicants may send in unsolicited proposals for research and 
education projects, in any existing or emerging fields. In the design of its calls 
and more generally in its operation, the NSF solicits advice from groups of 
experts to monitor which areas are most promising. 
 
 
84 Erawatch, USA, country profile, online: http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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Large national or cross-agency top-down programmes are less common than 
single-agency initiatives, although there are some thematic policies within the 
US research policy portfolio going across federal agencies. These programmes 
are often coordinated through national agencies such as the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, which also serves a review and advisory function.85 
Two examples are presented below. In each of the cross-agency programmes, 
the involvement of the various agencies is different and tailored to their 
competencies and to the initiatives that are yearly supported by the 
programme. Funding vehicles are defined in a decentralised manner in each 
agency and department.   
Figure 16 Example of mission-orientated funding delivered through national 
cross-agency programmes (USA) 
Name Organisation Targets and type of 
research supported 
Objectives Budget 
National 
Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI) 
 25 participating 
agencies 
 Parent 
organisation is the 
National Science 
and Technology 
Council (NSTC) 
 Run through the 
National 
Nanotechnology 
Coordinating 
Office (NNCO) 
 Support basic and 
applied research 
 Key activities: research 
funding, support for the 
creation of university and 
government nanoscale 
R&D laboratories, 
education, support cross-
disciplinary networks and 
partnerships, 
dissemination 
 Dates back to 1998 
with the formalisation 
of this Interagency 
Working Group on 
Nanotechnology 
(IWGN), raised 
in 2001, to level of 
federal initiative and 
changes name 
 Mission is to 
accelerate the 
discovery, 
development, and 
deployment of 
nanoscale science, 
engineering, and 
technology 
$2.1b in 2012 
 
U.S. Global 
Change 
Research 
Programme 
(USGCRP) 
 Thirteen 
departments and 
agencies 
participate 
 Key activities: research 
funding, participation to 
policy-making through 
information, 
communication, 
education, conducting 
sustained assessment 
 Was mandated by 
Congress in the Global 
Change Research Act 
of 1990 
 Mission is to conduct 
work aimed at 
understanding, 
assessing, and 
responding to global 
change 
$2.6b in 2012 
 
 
 
85 Erawatch, USA, country profile, online: http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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Figure 17 NNI budget by Agency (2001-2009) 
 
Source: Website of the NNI: http://www.nano.gov/about-nni/what/funding. 
 
Figure 18 USGCRP budget by Agency (2001-2013) 
 
In millions of constant FY 2012 dollars.  Executive Office of the president of the USA, Meeting the 
Challenges of Global Change, The U.S. Global Change Research Program in the 2013 Budget. 
 
4.4 Missions and basic research in China 
China’s staggering progress in R&D as well as in industrialisation over the last 
30 years or so is well known.  Because this is to a fair degree a planned 
process, it is in many respects easier to understand the overall pattern of 
activity than in other countries. Figure 19 shows the growth of R&D 
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expenditures, within which the basic research component has been fairly 
constantly around 5%.  This is a comparatively low proportion, reflecting the 
fact that China is playing ‘catch-up’ in many areas of science and technology.   
Figure 19 Growth in Chinese GERD by type of research supported (1991-2009) 
(Million 2005 Dollars - Constant prices and PPPs) 
 
Source: Technopolis based on: OECD, MSTI, R-D expenditure by sector of performance and type of R&D. 
Since 2007, China has been the most prolific producer of scientific 
publications after the USA (Figure 20).   
Figure 20 Chinese Publications in the Web of Science, 1986-2009   
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Web of Science 
Not only the volume but also the quality (measured as a bibliometric Relative 
Impact Indicator) of Chinese publications has been increasing. However, it 
remains somewhat below the world average (Figure 21).   
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Figure 21 Relative Impacts of National Publications Relative to the World, 
1986-2009 
 Source: Thomson Reuters Web of Science 
The bulk of Chinese basic research is thematically orientated.  Non-oriented 
funding in China is mainly provided through the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (NSFC), which is the largest funder of bottom-up-
initiated research, though it is smaller than the other basic research funding 
channels combined (Figure 22). 
Figure 22 Main Basic Research Funding Channels in China (1999-2009) 
Source: International Evaluation of Funding and Management of the National Natural Science Foundation 
of China, 2011 
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Within NSFC, small projects and young researcher programmes have no 
thematic priorities.  Larger projects and centres of excellence in practice have 
to have some relation with national thematic priorities (which are rather 
broad, to be fair)86.  Given that non-basic funding is thematically orientated, 
this means that China operates with the ‘Programme 1 / Programme 2 
structure described earlier.   
China is currently implementing a 15-year ‘Medium to Long-Term Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology’ (MLP). It aims to raise the 
proportion of GDP devoted to GERD from 1.5% or so in 2006 to 2.5% in 2020, 
dramatically to reduce dependence upon imported technologies and to induce 
a culture and practice of domestic innovation87.  It also aims to raise the 
proportion of GERD devoted to basic research from the current 5% to a USA-
like 15% by 2020 – remembering that in Chinese funding practice the bulk of 
basic research is thematically specified.   
Key features of the MLP are five ‘high priority clusters’ 
 Technologies for water, energy and environmental protection 
 IT, advanced materials and manufacturing 
 Biotechnologies and their applications 
 Space and marine technology 
 Basic sciences and frontier technology 
These are implemented in part through twenty themes ranging from 
agriculture through service industries, high-technology industry and transport 
to urban development.  These address China’s weak record in 
commercialisation and innovation, the gap between national capabilities and 
needs in areas such as energy, water, environmental protection and public 
health, defence technologies and the modest quality of much scientific 
research.  Some of these priorities are implemented through thirteen 
engineering and four science ‘mega-projects’.   
The thematic priorities of the MLP are spelt out in considerable detail.  They 
are not the result of ivory-tower central planning, however, but build on 
consultation with more than 2000 scientists, engineers and corporate 
executives (including both social scientists and foreign researchers).   
The MLP brings together an integrated set of measures intended to develop 
the national research and innovation system as a whole. 
1. A boost for government investment in R&D 
 
 
86 International Evaluation of Funding and Management of the National Natural Science Foundation of China, 
Beijing: NSFC, 2011 
87Cong Cao, Richard P Suttmeier and Denis Fred Simon, ‘China’s 15-year science and technology plan’, Physics Today 
December 2006, pp38-43 
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2. Tax incentives for science, technology and innovation 
3. A government policy of innovative procurement 
4. Deliberately assimilating and building upon imported technology 
5. Increased use of patenting and other forms of intellectual property, 
combined with the implementation of an IPR regime and practice similar 
to that of Western countries 
6. Building a mix of basic research infrastructure, infrastructure in the 
research institutes to enable them to collaborate more closely with 
industry, technology platforms to help enable innovation  
7. Supporting capacity building in the Chinese R&D community by attracting 
foreigners and expatriate Chinese to work in the Chinese research system 
8. Large-scale funding for innovation and engineering projects88 
The fact that the Chinese research and innovation system is under 
development and that this development is clearly explained in a plan is very 
helpful to foreign observers.  In particular it makes it clear that 
 The balance of effort is firmly towards national and industrial missions, 
especially innovation 
 Increased R&D investment is taking place in the context of a systemic 
pattern of intervention to secure the availability of human resources, 
adequate framework conditions and infrastructure across the academic 
and industrial R&D systems 
 The proportion of basic research is planned to rise towards US levels – but 
most of that growth will be Pasteur’s Quadrant work associated with 
national priorities – building on a foundation of bottom-up, excellence-
based funding 
It is a lot more difficult to coordinate all this in practice than it is on paper –
 but there is a clear picture of both the need for coordination and the balance 
of R&D effort required.   
4.5 Conclusions 
Despite some in-built conceptual weaknesses, the statistics collected by the 
OECD do tend to confirm our picture of an economy and an innovation 
process that is increasingly research and science based.  Basic research 
becomes more and more important as countries become economically 
developed and as companies approach the ‘technology frontier’.  This happens 
independently of how the money to pay for these research activities is 
distributed.  However, it is counter-productive to develop the research parts of 
the innovation system without at the same time maintaining significant 
activities to do with applications and development.  
 
 
88Mu Rongping, ‘China’, UNESCO Science Report 2010: The Current Status of Science Around the World, Paris: 
UNESCO, 2010  
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In Europe, we have largely abandoned the historical role of the state in 
supplementing market coupling through ‘development pairs’.  Others –
 notably the USA but also China – have maintained a more developmental 
policy where large mission-driven programmes build and maintain capacity in 
areas of importance to industry and society more broadly.   
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5. The Framework Programme and Horizon 2020  
Horizon 2020 in part reflects a realisation that the ‘European Paradox’ is not a 
paradox at all.  Europe is bad at innovation because it is bad at innovation; the 
amount and quality of European research has little to do with this fact.  Two of 
Horizon 2020’s three ‘pillars’, and a number of its new instruments, address 
this fact, placing focus on industrial and societal missions and aiming to fill 
systemic gaps that have historically impeded the coupling of demand and 
innovation.  To this extent it carries on the historically successful role of the 
Framework Programme in restructuring and improving the European 
innovation system and the bulk of any resource increases needs to be devoted 
to these areas.  The European Research Council is having a positive effect on 
bottom-up basic research funding across the Member States and can exert 
even greater influence over quality by further ‘leveraging’ its coordinating role 
in partnership with Member State research councils.   
We begin by discussing the challenges addressed by Horizon 2020 before 
pointing out some of the important and successful dimensions of past 
Framework Programmes.  Next we show that much of Horizon 2020 is to be 
understood as a continuation of the Framework Programme tradition.  We 
look at how the three pillars of Horizon 2020 contribute to meeting the 
challenges and conclude that the best way to use increased budget would be 
focus on mission- and innovation-related activities in order to tackle the 
central weaknesses in European innovation.   
5.1 The key challenges 
The idea of a ‘European Paradox’ was popularised in the Commission’s Green 
Paper on Innovation89 in 1995.  Like the earlier UK Paradox and the later 
Swedish one, it comprises the idea that ‘we’ do excellent research but that 
paradoxically it does not make us economically successful.  The evidence for 
the European paradox offered in the Green Paper was that EU produced 
slightly more publications per unit of non-business R&D than either the USA 
or Japan, while producing fewer patents per unit of business expenditure on 
R&D than these same countries.  Even if the premise were correct, it would not 
follow that the combination of excellent research and poor innovation 
performance is in any way paradoxical.  If you are bad at innovation, you 
innovate and compete badly.  If you innovate, it is useful to have a rich and 
high quality research system around you, but that does not cause you to 
innovate.  Despite this logic, the idea of a paradox remains attractive – 
perhaps because it allows us to flatter ourselves with the idea that we are 
 
 
89 European Commission, Green Paper on Innovation, 1995 
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clever while blaming foreigners for ‘stealing’ our clever ideas and making all 
the money.  Members of the Swedish research community love to tell the story 
of the flat screen display being invented in Sweden but then exploited in the 
Far East.  The current equivalent at the European level is the idea that most of 
the important research on crystalline solar photovoltaics was done in Europe 
while most of the production has moved to China90.   
In fact, the idea that European research is excellent is undoubtedly true in 
some areas of science, but at the overall level on a range of bibliometric 
indicators including those shown in Figure 24, it is not.  What makes the big 
difference between EU and US innovation performance is  
 Substantially higher Business Expenditure on R&D (see Figure 8) 
 A level of government funding of R&D in industry about twice that of the 
EU (Figure 23) 
 The presence of a large number of technology and research-based 
missions, ranging from defence through energy and transportation to 
health that generate a mixture of basic and applied research and a 
substantial quantity of development 
 Significantly better participation rates in higher education91 
Figure 23 Proportion of BERD Funded By Government, 1981-2009 
 
 
 
90 High-Level Expert Group Report on Key Enabling Technologies, Brussels: European Commission, 2011 
91Giovanni Dosi, Patrick Llerena and Mauro Sylos-Labini, ;The relationships between science, technologies and their 
industrial exploitation: An illustration through the myths and realities of the so-called “European Paradox”’, 
Research Policy, 35(10), 2006, 1450-1464 
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Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators 
Bibliometric evidence suggests there is a problem in the quality of EU 
research.  For example, Figure 24 shows that the EU contribution to the top 
10% of most highly cited publications is barely better than the world average, 
relative to the number of publications – and well behind the US performance.  
Figure 24 Contributions to the 10% most cited publications, 2001-9 
 
Source: Innovation Union Competitiveness Report, 2011, Brussels, European Commission 
Data: Science Metrix / Scopus (Elsevier) 
Note: (1) The 'contribution to the 10% most cited scientific publications' indicator is the ratio of the share in 
the total number of the 10% most frequently 
cited scientific publications worldwide to the share in the total number of scientific publications worldwide. 
The numerators are calculated from the total number of citations per publication for the publications 
published in 2001 and cited between 2001 and 2004, from the total number of citations per publication for 
the publications published in 2004 and cited between 2004 and 2007 and from the total number of citations 
per publication from the publications published in 2007 and cited between 2007 and 2009. A ratio above 
1.0 means that the country contributes more to highly-cited high-impact publications than would be 
expected from it's share in total scientific publications worldwide. 
 
In the detail it appears that European science is only quantitatively 
comparable to US science, but is weaker in overall quality and is severely 
under-represented in the upper tail of scientific quality.  European science is 
strong in those fields characterised by slow growth and weak in those 
characterised by rapid or turbulent growth; it is strong in fields characterised 
by a convergent pattern of growth and weak in those characterised by a 
divergent or proliferating pattern of growth; and it is strong in fields where 
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Europe has built common research infrastructure but weaker in those fields 
reliant on cooperation but not infrastructure92.   
The latest Innovation Union Competitiveness report (2011) stresses four major 
challenges for Europe 
1. Under-investment in R&D in Europe – not only by the state but especially 
by business 
2. Weak knowledge exchange between science and industry 
3. Improving but still far from adequate quality in research 
4. Unfavourable framework conditions for innovation  
Horizon 2020 addresses these, though the fourth also involves considerable 
additional effort in areas such as regulation.  Behind the headline problems 
lies a diagnosis of stagnation in the level of European research and innovation 
effort (especially in business), failure to establish and grow enough new 
companies that shake up and renew the industrial structure (or to reinvent old 
ones to the same effect), failure to modernise research and education 
institutions and properly to link them to the rest of society and the persistence 
of fragmentation among Member States.   
5.2 What has the Framework Programme done for us? 
The main European instrument available to tackle these deficits is the 
Framework Programme, which is now extended to cover more innovation 
dimensions than before and renamed ‘Horizon 2020’.   The evaluation record 
shows that the Framework Programme has been a powerful instrument for 
tackling at least some of these issues. The evidence93 suggests that the FP 
funds high-quality R&D.  Its growth has been accompanied by growth in high-
quality international co-publication.  It attracts the more excellent researchers 
in their fields and the more research-intensive companies.  It is pre-
competitive, so it primarily produces ‘intermediate knowledge outputs’ as well 
as technical and market network relationships that are re-used in other R&D 
and business processes. Participants who enter projects with a deliberate 
product or process innovation objective are more likely to obtain short-term 
results than others.   
With few exceptions, the FP is too competitive to allow capacity building – that 
has to be done with national resources.  Most participants have only a fleeting 
relationship with the FP via one or two projects and then they move on.  
However, new participants appear to learn the value of networked R&D and 
 
 
92Andrea Bonaccorsi, ‘Explaining poor performance of European science: institutions versus policies’, Science and 
Public Policy, 34 (5) 2007, 303-316  
93 Erik Arnold, John Clark and Alessandro Muscio, ‘What the evaluation record tells us about Framework Programme 
performance’, Science and Public Policy, Vol 32, No 5, 2005, pp385-397; Erik Arnold, Framework Programme 6: 
Meta-Evaluation, Brussels: European Commission, DG Research, 2009 
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increasingly to participate in ‘open innovation’ activities.  There is a strong 
core of established players and networks whose composition slowly shifts over 
time.  You have to ‘earn your spurs’ in order to join these networks and to 
carry on delivering value to your partners if you want to survive.  The FP is 
often associated with pre-normalisation R&D and the development of 
technical standards.  Most participants believe that FP participation increases 
their competitiveness.  
A recent pilot study of the long-term impacts of the Framework Programme94 
identified a range of ‘impact mechanisms’.  It included six substantial cases 
studies of themes impacted by the FP: Quantum Information Processing and 
Computing; brain research; atmospheric Ozone research (O3); solar 
photovoltaics (PV); automotive industry technologies; and the Manufuture 
Technology Platform.  The study found that the scientifically focused cases 
contain elements of discovery.  The Framework is funding serious science and 
this leads in some cases to progress at a quite fundamental or basic level.  Of 
course, discovery alone is not all that useful.  To have societal effects, it must 
be placed in a wider system that connects it with needs, opportunities, 
production and eventually markets or other competitive arenas such as 
policymaking.  In four of the cases, the FP made a clear contribution by 
increasing the volume of knowledge production, especially in relation to 
applications.  This can involve ‘translational research’ (which ‘pushes’ 
fundamental knowledge towards applications) but perhaps more 
fundamentally makes connections with potential uses and users, often making 
the mix of work more interdisciplinary, since it is usually the case that the 
closer research gets to solving real-life problems the more disciplines need to 
be involved.  In one case (QPIC) the Framework Programme appears to have 
made a decisive contribution to the development of a new discipline.   
The study concluded that at the systemic level the Framework Programme 
does not provide the simple stimuli implied by the linear models but is a 
complex intervention addressing research and innovation networks and 
systems.  As a pre-competitive, open innovation initiative, it transfers a lot of 
knowledge into and out of the stock of knowledge, an activity that inherently 
has high spillovers.  Its increasing focus on coordination and re-optimising the 
European innovation system at the European level helps break national lock-
ins and provides a way to increase the rate of innovation.  Increasingly, it 
connects research and innovation to other concerns, moving towards a holistic 
approach to policy.  By empowering stakeholder groups to develop and exploit 
their own strategic intelligence within a wider policy framework, it captures 
and exploits the power of self-organisation rather than central planning.   
 
 
94Erik Arnold, Malin Carlberg, Flora Giaracca, Andrej Horvath, Zsusza Jávorka, Paula Knee, Bea Mahieu, Ingeborg 
Meijer, Sabeen Sidiqi and James Stroyan, Long-term Impacts of the Framework Programme, Brussels: EC, DG-
Research, 2011 
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increasingly to participate in ‘open innovation’ activities.  There is a strong 
core of established players and networks whose composition slowly shifts over 
time.  You have to ‘earn your spurs’ in order to join these networks and to 
carry on delivering value to your partners if you want to survive.  The FP is 
often associated with pre-normalisation R&D and the development of 
technical standards.  Most participants believe that FP participation increases 
their competitiveness.  
A recent pilot study of the long-term impacts of the Framework Programme94 
identified a range of ‘impact mechanisms’.  It included six substantial cases 
studies of themes impacted by the FP: Quantum Information Processing and 
Computing; brain research; atmospheric Ozone research (O3); solar 
photovoltaics (PV); automotive industry technologies; and the Manufuture 
Technology Platform.  The study found that the scientifically focused cases 
contain elements of discovery.  The Framework is funding serious science and 
this leads in some cases to progress at a quite fundamental or basic level.  Of 
course, discovery alone is not all that useful.  To have societal effects, it must 
be placed in a wider system that connects it with needs, opportunities, 
production and eventually markets or other competitive arenas such as 
policymaking.  In four of the cases, the FP made a clear contribution by 
increasing the volume of knowledge production, especially in relation to 
applications.  This can involve ‘translational research’ (which ‘pushes’ 
fundamental knowledge towards applications) but perhaps more 
fundamentally makes connections with potential uses and users, often making 
the mix of work more interdisciplinary, since it is usually the case that the 
closer research gets to solving real-life problems the more disciplines need to 
be involved.  In one case (QPIC) the Framework Programme appears to have 
made a decisive contribution to the development of a new discipline.   
The study concluded that at the systemic level the Framework Programme 
does not provide the simple stimuli implied by the linear models but is a 
complex intervention addressing research and innovation networks and 
systems.  As a pre-competitive, open innovation initiative, it transfers a lot of 
knowledge into and out of the stock of knowledge, an activity that inherently 
has high spillovers.  Its increasing focus on coordination and re-optimising the 
European innovation system at the European level helps break national lock-
ins and provides a way to increase the rate of innovation.  Increasingly, it 
connects research and innovation to other concerns, moving towards a holistic 
approach to policy.  By empowering stakeholder groups to develop and exploit 
their own strategic intelligence within a wider policy framework, it captures 
and exploits the power of self-organisation rather than central planning.   
 
 
94Erik Arnold, Malin Carlberg, Flora Giaracca, Andrej Horvath, Zsusza Jávorka, Paula Knee, Bea Mahieu, Ingeborg 
Meijer, Sabeen Sidiqi and James Stroyan, Long-term Impacts of the Framework Programme, Brussels: EC, DG-
Research, 2011 
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The FP6 evaluation95 stressed that the historical role of the Framework 
programme has been as a creator and amplifier of consensus.  While this had 
led to many successes, the FP needed a countervailing force that challenged 
conventional wisdom and research directions, opening up new opportunities 
and argued that the Future Emerging Technologies programme and the New 
and Emerging Fields in Science and Technology programme (which was 
cancelled early in the life of FP6) were important prototypes for such 
convention-challenging instruments.  Arguably, the ERC also responds to this 
need for a mix of researcher-initiated and programmed effort.  
The ERC is too new to have been decisively evaluated.  The EURECIA96 project 
has recently produced preliminary evidence, suggesting that the ERC has some 
major successes to its credit.  It has established itself as a ‘model’ research 
council, influencing the funding practices of others at Member State level and 
has established a reputation for having a very demanding quality standard.  It 
has ‘leveraged’ national research council funding in several Member and 
Associated States, which have adopted a practice of funding nationally projects 
that have passed the ERC quality threshold but which the ERC did not then 
fund.  It has provided a way for Member States to benchmark the quality of 
national research applications and increased the negotiating power of grantees 
with respect to their organisations, helping them attract more resources.  
While it is expected that the ERC will lead to an inflow of high-calibre 
scientists to the EU, there is not yet evidence that this is the case. 
5.3 Horizon 2020  
Horizon 2020 offers a new architecture for the Commission’s interventions in 
research and technological development, comprising three ‘pillars’  
 Industrial leadership 
 Societal challenges 
 Excellent science 
The Commission proposes that the research and technological development 
parts of Horizon 2020 should have a combined budget of some €78bn – 43% 
higher (in current money) than FP7’s €54bn. At this aggregated level, we can 
regard the Industrial Leadership and Societal Challenges pillars essentially as 
a rearrangement of the effort described as ‘cooperation’ in FP7 (Figure 25).   
 
 
95Ernst Th Rietschel (Chair), Erik Arnold (Rapporteur) et al, Evaluation of the Sixth Framework Programmes for 
Research and Technological Development 2002-2006, Brussels European Commission, 2009 
96 www.eurecia-erc.net/events/final-conference/ accessed April 2012 
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Figure 25 Main Pillars of FP7/CIS and Horizon 2020 
 
 
 
The Excellent Science component grows a little as a proportion of the total, 
reflecting the fact that the ERC started small and grew through the life of FP7. 
However, once we look inside the pillars, somewhat less radical change is 
evident, though there are some significant readjustments.  Figure 26 shows 
that inside the Excellent Science pillar, the ERC is the major beneficiary of 
change. In the Societal Challenges pillar, we can see that the individual 
challenge areas grow slightly as a share of the overall (much larger) budget, 
compared with FP7.  The focus on sustainability issues clearly increases 
between FP7 and Horizon 2020 (Figure 27). In the Industrial Leadership 
pillar, the industrial technologies are in fact the great losers in the transition to 
Horizon 2020 (Figure 28) – which is surprising given the stated aim in 
Horizon 2020 to reverse the declining trend in industrial involvement evident 
since FP5.   
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Figure 26 Excellent Science Compared with FP7 Equivalents (% of respective 
budget) 
 
Note: the FET FP7 budget is estimated (based on the draft orientations for the ICT work programme from 
January 2012) 
Figure 27 Societal Challenges Compared with FP7 (% of respective budget) 
 
 
Figure 28 Industrial Leadership Compared with FP7 (% of respective budget) 
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The three pillars in effect offer the Commission's clientèle 'something for 
everyone': more researcher-initiated funding for the research community; 
tackling the 'grand challenges' for the political level; and increased efforts in 
innovation and commercialisation for the industrial community.  Whether the 
large budget proposed to deliver all this can survive the reality of austerity 
among the Member States is not clear – and raises the question whether there 
is a 'right' balance among these lines of action, as opposed to seeking crowd-
pleasing budget increases everywhere. 
The historical justification for the Commission to pursue the Framework 
Programme has been the idea of 'European Added Value': the notion that 
together the Member States (MS) can achieve things that are impossible at the 
national level.  Since the launch of ERA, European Added Value has 
increasingly shifted from networking MS-level activities to 'optimising' the 
European research and innovation system at the European level. Increasingly, 
the Commission aims to do this not only using European-level resources but 
also by coordinating or 'structuring' MS-level resources, in the form of both 
money and research performance.  The Treaty now gives the Commission the 
right to legislate about research and technological development so this 
continent-wide influence will only increase, allowing the Commission to move 
beyond R&D funding to tackle framework conditions such as a proper 
common market in knowledge that are necessary in order to build the ERA 
and allow Europe's strengthened research actors to operate at the European 
scale.   
While hitherto it has been possible to see European- and MS-level research 
R&D policies as largely independent, the European level increasingly 
influences the whole and will become a more important determinant of the 
continent-wide policy mix.  A corollary of this increasingly European effort to 
optimise policy is the need for MS, singly and in variable-geometry groupings, 
to pursue specialised strategies in areas of comparative advantage.  Many of 
the 'ERA instruments' innovated by the Commission in recent years support 
this specialisation and help empower stakeholders to develop and pursue 
variable-geometry strategies that serve the European interest by building 
larger, stronger, specialised, cross-border R&D communities.  The growing 
importance of EU-level R&D policy makes it crucial not only to innovate new 
instruments that support the development of the ERA but also to foster a 
balance between fundamental and more applied research that is conducive to 
achieving both the Union's societal and its industrial goals.   
This balance, however, needs to be determined not within Horizon 2020 but 
in relation to the needs of the European research and innovation system as a 
whole. That is one reason it contains thematic priorities – some things need 
EU-level intervention and will get it via Horizon 2020; others do not or are 
less important and they are not part of the grand design.  Equally, while at the 
level of the European research and innovation system as a whole it is 
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important that there is a range of effective support to different kinds of 
research and innovation activities – ranging from fundamental research to 
innovation financing – the Commission does not need to intervene in areas 
where others are doing a good job or where there is no need for intervention, 
simply in order to have a ‘balanced’ set of instruments. An oddity, therefore, is 
that Horizon 2020 inter alia aims at, “The integration of research and 
innovation by providing seamless97 and coherent funding from idea to 
market.”  The implication is that – despite the best efforts of the MS – there 
are EU-level deficiencies in funding mechanisms at every step from idea to 
market.  This is unlikely and it is well to note that few MS would try to offer 
such a set of funding instruments from a single programme or organisation.  
Commercialisation funding needs business judgements to be made at several 
stages.  This is normally provided in such a way that technology funders do not 
risk throwing good money after bad by trying to assess the business prospects 
of ideas to which they are already committed.  Generally, they try to involve 
private sector financing to an ever-greater degree the closer the funding need 
is to the end market because (a) the closer to market the less defensible state 
interventions are and (b) MS generally believe that the private sector tends to 
make better judgements about markets than the state.  What is important, 
however, is to strengthen Horizon 2020 in ways that relate to the weaknesses 
in European innovation, such as the three pillars described in the KETs 
report98: technological research; product demonstration; and competitive 
manufacturing.   
5.4 How do the Horizon 2020 pillars contribute? 
Based on the problem diagnoses of the Innovation Union Competitiveness 
Report, the current thinking on European Added Value and what we can see 
from the evaluation evidence, Figure 29 analyses the expected contribution of 
each of Horizon 2020’s three pillars to European policy objectives and Added 
Value.  The categories used are not fully orthogonal, we have no way to weight 
them relative to each other and the judgements about the relative 
contributions of the pillars are qualitative so we must approach the analysis 
with caution.  Nonetheless, the Figure gives a basis for discussing the relative 
payoffs to each pillar and the desirable relative roles of the European and 
national levels.   
Figure 29 How Horizon 2020 Pillars Address European Policy Objectives and 
Added Value 
Policy Objectives / European Added Value Industry Society Science 
Stimulates business R&D expenditure XXX XX  
 
 
97 Our emphasis 
98High-Level Expert Group Report on Key Enabling Technologies, Brussels: European Commission, 2011 
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Policy Objectives / European Added Value Industry Society Science 
Supports creation of high-growth firms XX X  
Addresses framework conditions for innovation XX X  
Stimulates science-industry knowledge exchange XXX XX  
Acts as a ‘focusing device’, road mapping, reducing uncertainty XXX XXX  
Builds on existing scientific and industrial strengths XXX XXX XXX 
Breaks down national industrial and scientific lock-ins XX XX X 
Induces or reinforces behavioural change by R&D performers XXX XXX X 
Supports the creation of critical masses and networks in R&D XXX XXX X 
Promotes research competition at the European level XXX XXX XXX 
Funds and stimulates high-quality R&D  XXX XXX XXX 
Generates knowledge spillovers XXX XXX XXX 
Supports development of human capital in R&D XXX XXX XXX 
Helps establish new fields or disciplines XX XX X 
Supports scientific discovery XX XX XXX 
Leverages national funds into European configurations XXX XXX  
Supports improved policymaking XX XXX  
Supports internationalisation of the ERA XX XXX XX 
Addresses problems too big for individual Member States XXX XXX XX 
Addresses areas of major socio-economic importance for the EU XXX XXX  
 
The ‘Industry’ and ‘Society’ pillars have a lot in common because they emerge 
from the common Framework Programme history – originally through the 
traditional ‘cooperation’ projects; more recently supplemented by various 
variable geometry initiatives (ERA-NETs, Technology Platforms, Joint 
Technology Initiatives, Joint Programming, the SET and Recovery Plans, etc) 
that empower groups of stakeholders to establish their own programmes.  
These newer instruments make the previously rather implicit coordination 
role of the Framework Programme much more explicit. 
As Figure 29 shows, the Industry and Society pillars tackle most of the 
challenges for European R&D set out in the Competitiveness Report.  Their 
networked character is intended to overcome fragmentation in the European 
research and innovation system and to ‘structure’ that system better to ensure 
EU competitiveness and to meet EU-level needs.  The logic of the Science 
pillar is very different.  It relies on competition among individuals rather than 
cooperation among organisations to achieve impacts.   
The Industry and Society pillars address policy objectives related to increasing 
business expenditures on R&D.  Creating high-growth firms has not been a 
strong focus of the Framework Programme in the past; here and in improving 
the framework conditions for innovation it will be necessary to employ 
instruments (such as finance, for which some provision is made in Horizon 
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2020) that go beyond the traditional ones and also to tackle aspects of 
regulation that are not within the scope of Horizon 2020 but fit with the 
Commission’s wider efforts to regulate for the ERA.  Science-industry 
cooperation has been central to the FP since the start but has so far not been 
addressed by the ERC.  Acting as a ‘focusing device signalling to science and 
industry about important topics, research questions and ultimately funding 
and business opportunities as well as creating consensus about future 
technological developments and standards are long-standing contributions of 
the FP.   
All three pillars tend to focus on building on existing strengths rather than 
creating new capacity.  Only where new fields are explored, so that there are 
not already strong players able to win in competition, can competitive funding 
– whether in traditional FP mode or in research council mode – build capacity.  
However, the act of programming – and to a limited extent the act of raising 
the competitive pressure, as the ERC does  – can jolt stakeholders out of 
established trajectories and lock-ins and change behaviour.  Networking has 
been the traditional FP approach to building critical mass.  While the Science 
pillar fosters individual researchers rather than organisations, it does also 
increase their negotiating power within their own organisations and their 
national research funding systems, so there may be some mass-building effect.   
All three pillars are highly competitive, funding high-quality R&D and 
stimulating knowledge spillovers through various channels including the 
training and development of researchers. The FP has shown that it can help 
get new fields established, but this is not a primary activity.  In principle, new 
fields can emerge from an individual scientist’s research grant, but there is 
little machinery in Science for helping this to happen.  Science is of course 
more focused on discovery than the other pillars.   
Policy-related objectives, such as leveraging and coordinating the use of 
national funds in pursuit of specific themes or problems, improving 
policymaking and more generally addressing areas of socio-economic 
importance are more clearly addressed by the Industry and Society pillars.   All 
three address the internationalisation agenda.  Science tackles problems too 
big for individual Member States to handle, in the sense that it creates a 
European-scale competition arena.  However, the ERC has demonstrated that 
it can achieve this by influencing the behaviour of MS research funders.  The 
subsidiarity principle therefore implies that it should continue in this role 
rather than to expand.  To the extent that the key defects in the EU research 
and innovation system concern innovation it is the Industry and Society pillars 
that need strengthening.   
Especially with the addition of Science to the former FP activities, Horizon 
2020 mixes up a number of governance modes.   
• The old consultative logic of FP Cooperation often lacks transparency but 
nonetheless has produced significant results through networking and 
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coordinating R&D.  Here the Commission deals directly with stakeholders 
but after consultation itself decides on the thematic priorities, work 
programmes and calls (again with a lot of input from the stakeholders) 
 The newer ERA instruments tend to involve steering committees of experts 
external to the Commission but who tend not to represent the Member 
States either.  But they provide platforms for stakeholders to self-organise, 
define agendas and to varying degrees fund them  
 The Industry and Society pillars use both modes of governance to address 
a range of challenges relevant to most Member States and therefore to 
Europe as a whole 
 Science, especially the ERC, is more akin to traditional ‘bottom up’ 
scientific funding where the scientific community effectively sets priorities 
This combination equips the EU to operate the ‘Programme 2, Programme 1’ 
logic described above.   
In ‘Programme 2’ at the European level, the Science pillar complements and 
strengthens national efforts to maintain wide-ranging scientific capabilities (in 
both research and human capital development so as to enable both the 
generation and the absorption of knowledge) by setting higher quality 
standards.  This is already ‘leveraging’ national funding at the project level 
through national research councils funding above-threshold projects that ERC 
itself cannot fund.  This will have a beneficial effect on national quality while 
leaving space for the national level to take as much or as little of the ERC 
medicine as it thinks necessary.  Diversity of funding sources is important in 
science.  “If we want to grasp the real economic significance of science, we 
need to recognise it as a source of variety …. It causes new states of the world 
to proliferate.”99  The work funded will be a mixture of fundamental and 
applied research.  Comparatively modest investment is needed at the EU level 
in order to exert this influence.   Addressing the mobility challenge through 
European instruments is inherently more expensive.   
In ‘Programme 1 at the EU level, the other two Pillars build on the foundations 
of Programme 2 to focus resources and capacity on themes that have societal 
and industrial priority.  Here, too, there is a mixture of fundamental and more 
applied work – with the fundamental work by definition being in ‘Pasteur’s 
Quadrant’.  The mix of research types will be driven by the needs of the 
specific themes pursued, rather than being determined in advance according 
to some general principle.  To the extent that these activities at the EU level 
are network building, they are inherently expensive to fund.  Major effort is 
needed here in order to tackle industry’s under-investment in R&D – 
especially D.  This argues for extending the scope of Horizon 2020 more 
towards product procurement, demonstration and tackling the market risks of 
 
 
99 Michel Callon, ‘Is science a public good?’ Science, Technology and Human Values, 19, 1994, 395-424 
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the large-scale disruptive technologies needed, for example in tackling climate 
change.  The trend towards ‘leveraging’ national resources through Joint 
Programming and attracting complementary funding from the national level is 
therefore positive but the value of the investment needed at the common 
European level is also high.   
Operating these two programmes at the EU level requires considerable 
strategic intelligence – monitoring the quality and quantity of effort available 
across the two programmes as a basis for changing course when needed.  A 
potential gap in the picture is the lack of EU-level responsibility for the 
development of disciplines.  (An interesting comparator for ERC is the 
National Science Foundation of China, which has an active role in ensuring the 
health and development of disciplines.  Doing something about this would, of 
course, require a more selective approach in pursuit of discipline 
development.)   
At the same time, since the endowments and needs of the Member States vary, 
there are clear limits to what can or should be done from the European level.  
Each state in effect needs to construct its own pair of Programmes 1 and 2, 
using a mixture of national and EU-level instruments - including of course 
selective use of variable geometry instruments.  Strategic intelligence therefore 
needs to be ‘distributed’100 – there need to be clear (indeed, generally clearer 
than is the case today101) national strategies about research and innovation 
more broadly and how to make best use of the European level in particular.  
That said, the complexity of defining such strategies is high, especially in the 
face of constant change in both the EU-level portfolio and national needs.  The 
EU has established good planning practices in areas such as the Structural 
Funds and in various regional programmes, requiring and supporting the 
development of regional innovation strategies so as to improve the practice of 
development.  While the OMC process has included both studies and peer 
reviews of national ‘policy mixes’ for innovation and research, these have not 
tended to produce policies or strategies that commit the Member States 
strongly.  A useful measure to increase the effectiveness of Horizon 2020 
would be a programme of further activity to encourage the Member States to 
develop such strategies.   
5.5 Conclusions 
The diagnoses of European needs in this paper and those that underlie 
Horizon 2020 are similar: while the quality of research also needs to be 
 
 
100Stefan Kuhlmann, Improving Distributed Intelligence in Complex Innovation Systems: Final Report of 
the Advanced Science & Technology Policy Planning Network (ASTPP), Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI, 1999 
101Ernst Th Rietschel (Chair), Erik Arnold (Rapporteur) et al, Evaluation of the Sixth Framework Programmes for 
Research and Technological Development 2002-2006, Brussels European Commission, 2009; Rolf Annergerg (Chair), 
Iain Begg (Rapporteur) et al, Interim Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme, Report of the Expert Group, 
Brussels: European Commission, 2010 
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improved, the key weaknesses of the European research and innovation 
system are in innovation activities.  Doing more science will not repair those 
weaknesses.  Rather, there is a need to expand mission-driven R&D for 
tackling industrial and societal needs.  The ERC seems already to be doing a 
good job of encouraging quality improvements, in partnership with national 
research councils.  The implications for Horizon 2020 are clear.  
 Focus resource increases on the innovation-relevant parts of the industrial 
and societal missions 
 Continue to fund a mixture of basic and applied research within those 
missions, but increase the effort on development and related functions 
 Maintain but do not increase the ERC effort; instead work in cooperation 
with national research councils to leverage the European level so as to raise 
national as well as European quality levels 
Not least because Horizon 2020 involves setting thematic priorities, it is 
important that the Member States complement it with clear national 
strategies.  The point of Horizon 2020 is partly to ‘optimise’ the European 
research and innovation system at the European level.  Member States 
therefore need to ensure that their own policies complement the European 
strategy in ways that serve the national interest.  In many cases, this will 
involve setting priorities that are not the same as the overall European ones.   
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improved, the key weaknesses of the European research and innovation 
system are in innovation activities.  Doing more science will not repair those 
weaknesses.  Rather, there is a need to expand mission-driven R&D for 
tackling industrial and societal needs.  The ERC seems already to be doing a 
good job of ncour ging quality improvements, in partnership with ational 
research councils.  The implications for Horizon 2020 are clear.  
 Focus resource increases on the innovation-relevant parts of the industrial 
and societal missions 
 Continue to fund a mixture of basic and applied research within those 
missions, but increase the effort on development and related functions 
 Maintain but do not increase the ERC effort; instead work in cooperation 
with national research councils to leverage the European level so as to raise 
national as well as European quality levels 
Not least because Horizon 2020 involves setting thematic priorities, it is 
important that the Member States complement it with clear national 
strategies.  The point of Horizon 2020 is partly to ‘optimise’ the European 
research and innovation system at the European level.  Member States 
therefore need to ensure that their own policies complement the European 
strategy in ways that serve the national interest.  In many cases, this will 
involve setting priorities that are not the same as the overall European ones.   
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 Maintain but do not increase the ERC effort; instead work in cooperation 
with national research councils to leverage the European level so as to raise 
national as well as European quality levels 
Not least because Horizon 2020 involves setting thematic priorities, it is 
important that the Member States complement it with clear national 
strategies.  The point of Horizon 2020 is partly to ‘optimise’ the European 
research and innovation system at the European level.  Member States 
therefore need to ensure that their own policies complement the European 
strategy in ways that serve the national interest.  In many cases, this will 
involve setting priorities that are not the same as the overall European ones.   
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